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ABSTRACT
The increasing frequency with which activities involving intellectual
property (“IP”) cross national borders now warrants a clear definition of the
territorial reach of national IP laws so that parties engaging in the activities
can operate with sufficient notice of the laws applicable to their activities. Legislators, however, have not devoted adequate attention to the territorial delineation of IP law; in fact, legislators rarely draft IP statutes with any consideration of cross-border scenarios, and with few exceptions IP laws are designed
with only single-country scenarios in mind. Delineating the reach of national
IP laws is actually a complex matter because the reach depends not only on
substantive IP law, but also on conflict of laws rules. Yet until recently conflict
of laws rules had rarely been considered or drafted with IP issues in mind. In
some countries, such as Switzerland, Poland, and China, legislators have reviewed conflict of laws rules in light of IP laws and passed conflict of laws
statutes with IP-specific provisions; the European Union has IP-specific provi-
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sions in its instruments on conflict of laws as well. In the United States, however, state conflict of laws rules provide no IP-specific rules, nor does the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which federal courts apply when
deciding federal question cases.
This Article argues that because of the rising importance of cross-border
IP activities and the increasing need for clear territorial delineation of IP laws,
it is important for legislators to give equal consideration to cross-border and
single-country scenarios when drafting legislation and to calibrate the territorial scope of national IP laws with conflict of laws rules to achieve the desired
territorial reach of national IP policies. This Article analyzes the interaction of
IP laws and conflict of laws rules and reviews from both the IP law and the
conflict of laws perspectives the various tools that are available to define the territorial reach of national IP laws. The fact that legislators deal with numerous
“moving pieces” (particularly the conflict of laws rules of foreign countries)
when they design the territorial reach of national laws should not discourage
the legislators from striving to improve certainty about the territorial reach of
national laws. Depending on the degree to which the “moving pieces” limit legislators’ ability to improve the certainty, countries may wish to negotiate and
enter into international agreements in order to set uniform conflict of laws
rules and define the limits of the territorial reach of national IP laws.
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INTRODUCTION
The increasing interest in cross-border aspects of IP litigation,
observable in recent years, has focused on two types of issues: establishing the territorial scope of substantive IP laws on the one hand
and designing and applying conflict of laws rules in IP cases on the
other.1 The existing literature addresses the two types of issues in
great detail,2 but treats the two types of issues mostly separately, with-

1. See infra Part I for the definition of conflict of laws rules.
2. Examples of recent literature include JENS ADOLPHSEN, EUROPÄISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT IN PATENTSACHEN (2005); JAMES J. FAWCETT &
PAUL TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011);
MARTA PERTEGÁS SENDER, CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT OF PATENT RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2002); STIG STRÖMHOLM, COPYRIGHT AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE
SURVEY (2010); W. R. Cornish, Intellectual Property Infringement and Private International Law:
Changing the Common Law Approach, 45 GRUR INT. 285 (1996); François Dessemontet, International Private Law of Intellectual Property, in VI YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 71, 71–84 (Petar Šarčević et al. eds., 2005); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private
International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711
(2010); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002); Paul
Edward Geller, Conflict of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and Ownership Issues, 51 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 315 (2004); Paul Edward Geller, Conflicts of Laws in Cyberspace: Rethinking International Copyright in a Digitally Networked World, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 571
(1996); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Private International Law of Copyright in an Era of Technological
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out sufficiently recognizing that it is the interaction of the territorial
scope of substantive IP laws, conflict of laws rules, and a country’s
physical ability to enforce its laws that delineates the effective territorial scope of national IP laws.3 This Article analyzes the interaction
and identifies tools that legislators may utilize to influence the effective territorial scope of national IP laws. How far national laws actually reach is of great importance today as cross-border activities are the
normal and not the exceptional course of business; because of the
cross-border nature of the activities, legislators need to seek advancement of national IP policies not only through substantive IP laws but
also through conflict of laws rules.
Recent developments have raised awareness of how important it
is to delineate clearly the territorial scope of substantive IP laws and
have shown why specialized conflict of laws rules would be useful. For
instance, recent United States Supreme Court cases, such as Microsoft
v. AT&T4 and Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,5 have highlighted
the complexities of applying U.S. IP laws to cross-border issues, while
the Court’s 2010 decision in Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd.6
stirred debate about the delineation of the extraterritorial application
of U.S. legislation in general. The Morrison decision criticized courts
for applying incorrectly the presumption against extraterritoriality—
the presumption that legislators enact laws effective only for the territory of their country unless they state otherwise7—and instructed
Change, 273 RECUEIL DES COURS 239, 239–406 (1998). For older literature see infra notes
12, 13, and 23.
3. See infra Part I for the definition of a country’s enforcement power and the effective territorial scope of national IP laws. On the recognition of the role that conflict of
laws rules play in defining the territorial scope of substantive laws (but not specifically IP
laws) see infra note 51. On the increasing realization of the significance of the role of conflict of laws rules in areas of substantive law see, e.g., Veerle Van Den Eeckhout, The Instrumentalisation of Private International Law: Quo Vadis? (Oct. 10, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2338375.
4. 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
5. 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
6. 561 U.S. 247 (2010). Morrison did not concern IP statutes; on the impact that the
decision might have on IP law see Timothy R. Holbrook, Should Foreign Patent Law Matter?,
34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 581, 602–08 (2012). See also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S.
Ct. 1659 (2013).
7. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255–57; see, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285 (1949). For a brief history of the presumption and its critique see, e.g., John H. Knox,
The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 40 SW. U. L. REV. 635 (2011). Outside the United States a presumption against extraterritoriality might not be officially formulated but is nevertheless respected by courts de facto. See, e.g., Ryuichi Yamakawa,
Transnational Dimension of Japanese Labor and Employment Laws: New Choice of Law Rules and

2015]

ADVANCING NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

207

courts to apply the presumption strictly;8 the decision also implied
that Congress must pay greater attention to the territorial design of
legislation, particularly if Congress intends for a particular piece of
legislation to have any extraterritorial application.9
The increased concern about the delineation of the extraterritorial effects of U.S. legislation coincides with a cluster of initiatives that
have appeared in recent years to draft proposals for special conflict of
laws rules for IP cases; a committee of the American Law Institute and
three groups of scholars in Europe and Asia have developed such
proposals,10 and an International Law Association committee is the

Determination of Geographical Reach, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 347, 365 (2010) (“[S]ince
the territoriality is the most traditional principle of jurisdiction in international jurisdictions, it is necessary for the courts [in Japan] to find at least some legislative intent to apply
statutes extraterritorially.”).
8. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261 (“The results of judicial-speculation-made law—divining
what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court—
demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Rather than guess
anew in each case, we apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable background
against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”).
9. Cf. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (suggesting that the presumption against extraterritoriality may be displaced under some circumstances). “[E]ven where the claims touch and
concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace
the presumption against extraterritorial application.” Id. After Morrison, the reaction of
Congress was immediate; Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act very shortly after the Supreme Court released the Morrison decision.
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). For a discussion of the effects of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act on the extraterritorial application
of the statute, see Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the
Extraterritorial Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92 B.U.
L. REV. 535, 546–47 (2012).
10. AM. LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION,
CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2008); EUROPEAN MAX
PLANCK GRP. ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE CLIP PRINCIPLES AND COMMENTARY (2013); TRANSPARENCY
PROPOSAL ON JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRANSPARENCY OF JAPANESE LAW
PROJECT,
(2009),
available
at
http://www.tomeika.jur.kyushuu.ac.jp/ip/pdf/Transparency%20RULES%20%202009%20Nov1.pdf; KOREAN PRIVATE
INT’L LAW ASSOC., PRINCIPLES ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION
(2010) (on file with author). In addition, the projects have produced rich resources for
further research in notes and commentaries to the principles and articles authored by
team members. See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL ARENA: JURISDICTION,
APPLICABLE LAW, AND THE RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS IN EUROPE, JAPAN AND THE U.S.
(Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2010); Annette Kur & Benedetta Ubertazzi, The ALI Principles
and the CLIP Project: A Comparison, in LITIGATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
DISPUTES CROSS-BORDER: EU REGULATIONS, ALI PRINCIPLES, CLIP PROJECT 89, 89–147
(Stefania Bariatti ed., 2010); Benedetta Ubertazzi, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Intellectual Property: A Comparison for the International Law Association, 3 J. INTELL.
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latest group to work on a proposal for such special rules.11 The interest in the intersection of conflict of laws and IP is not new; as early as
1889, for example, German conflict of laws expert Carl Ludwig von
Bar included an entire chapter on conflict of laws and IP in his conflict of laws treatise.12 In the 1970s, attempts to draft IP-specialized
conflict of laws rules emerged when European scholars, such as Professor Eugen Ulmer, assisted in designing one of the then-future European Communities instruments on conflict of laws.13 The recent
wave of interest in conflict of laws was propelled by the failure to conclude a large-scale international treaty on conflict of laws, and lately
the interest has been underscored by the Hague Conference on Private International Law’s 2012 reopening of negotiations of such a
treaty.14 IP-related issues were among the reasons for the failure of
the Hague Conference’s earlier attempts in the 1990s and early 2000s
to conclude a treaty, and therefore IP issues are among the hurdles
that the negotiators might be expected to overcome in this round.15
While territorial delineation of IP laws and the development of
IP-specific conflict of laws rules have received a great deal of attention
in recent years, national legislation has largely lagged behind this increase in attention.16 Legislators typically think of national laws as apPROP., INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 306 (2012). For difficulties associated with defining “IP disputes” see infra note 24.
11. ILA Committee on Intellectual Property and Private International Law, INT’L L. ASS’N,
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1037 (last visited August 28, 2013).
12. 2 CARL LUDWIG VON BAR, THEORIE UND PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN
PRIVATRECHTS 231–91 (1889). In civil law countries the term for conflict of laws is “private
international law.” Some may argue that the two terms do not coincide perfectly; however,
for the purposes of this Article the two terms may be equated. For the definition of “conflict of laws” see infra Part I.
13. EUGEN ULMER, DIE IMMATERIALGÜTERRECHTE IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT:
RECHTSVERGL, SCHRIFTENREIHE ZUM GEWERBLICHEN RECHTSSCHUTZ (1975); Paul H. Neuhaus, Die Immaterialgüterrechte im Künftigen Internationalen Privatrecht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, in 40 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT
189, 189–232 (B. Aubin et al. eds., 1976). The European Communities were the predecessors of the current European Union (“EU”).
14. See generally, The Judgments Project, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=149 (last visited Sept. 22,
2014).
15. See PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
ANNOTATED CHECKLIST OF ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED BY THE WORKING GROUP ON
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 13–14 (2013), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/hidden/2013/jdgm2013note01en.pdf.
16. Although the above-mentioned principles for conflict of laws in IP cases have not
yet been adopted by national legislators or international negotiators, courts have begun to
refer to the principles. See, e.g., Rundquist v. Vapiano SE, 798 F. Supp. 2d 102, 132 (D.D.C.
2011); Case C-616/10, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Solvay v. Honeywell,
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plying only within the borders of their country. There are of course
exceptions—laws that are purposefully designed to reach beyond the
borders of a country17—but most laws do not fall into this exceptional
category. Traditionally, national IP laws have also been designed to
apply only within national borders, since they have been considered
to be purely domestic laws with rights conferred by the laws limited to
the territory of the particular country.18 Only in unique circumstances have legislators added provisions in IP laws that address issues
crossing national borders;19 legislators have left other cross-border IP
issues for the courts to clarify,20 presumably because the issues have
arisen so infrequently that legislators have felt no need to render national policies into legal solutions for cross-border issues.21 Except for
a few notable examples,22 IP statutes and conflict of laws statutes have
been designed with negligible or no coordinated mutual input.23

2012 E.C.R. fn. 24; Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard Verlags et al., 2011 E.C.R. fn. 31;
Case C-170/12, Pinckney v. KDG Mediatech AG, 2013 E.C.R. fn. 53; Lucasfilm Ltd. v.
Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39 [93–94] (appeal taken from Eng.).
17. E.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
18. See infra Part III for a discussion of the principle of territoriality.
19. See, e.g., Patents and Protection of Patent Rights, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)–(g) (2012).
20. See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013); Transocean
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2012), cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 2333 (2014); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).
21. The legislative lack of awareness of the interaction can be explained by both the
historical rarity of cross-border IP disputes and the limited interest among experts from
both areas in the interaction of the areas. See, e.g., Graeme Dinwoodie, The Architecture of
the International Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 996 (2002) (“[T]he
cases that courts were called upon to resolve principally involved national rights [and] the
disputes that confronted courts were largely national in nature.”); see also STRÖMHOLM, supra note 2, at 57–60.
22. See, e.g., Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters art. 16.4, Sept. 27, 1968, 1978 O.J. (L 304) 36
[hereinafter Brussels Convention]; Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (recast), 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1
[hereinafter Brussels I Regulation (recast)]; Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Choice of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relations (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 1, 2011), Art. 48; Portuguese Civil Code, art. 48.
23. For examples of early scholarship on conflict of laws in intellectual property disputes see, e.g., Heinz W. Auerswald, Können Ansprüche wegen Verletzung eines ausländischen
Patents vor deutschen Gerichten verfolgt werden?, in FESTSCHRIFT WERNER VON STEIN 8 (1961);
Alois Troller, Europäisierung des Patentrechts und Gerichtsstand, 1955 GRUR INT. 529; Friedrich Groß, Wie mache ich im Inland Ansprüche aus Schutzrechten geltend, deren Verletzung im
Ausland erfolgt ist?, 1957 GRUR INT. 346; Otto-Friedrich Frhr. von Gamm, Die internationale
und örtliche Zuständigkeit im gewerblichen Rechtsschutz, in 50 MITTEILUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN
PATENTANWÄLTE 212 (1959); von Bar, supra note 12.
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A single-country perspective, however, has now become an unsuitable starting point for legislating; as globalization has intensified
the flow of IP across national borders it has brought into doubt the
premise that national policies can be sufficiently implemented
through laws that are designed to address only single-country activities. Not only do the well-publicized cases mentioned above illustrate
the rising importance of cross-border activities, but recent scholarship
also suggests that the number of cross-border IP disputes—IP disputes
that involve parties located or conduct occurring in multiple countries—is increasing.24 Even though only a small fraction of daily activities result in the legal disputes that appear in the statistics reported in
the scholarship, it seems reasonable to assume that together with
cross-border disputes all cross-border activities concerning IP are on
the rise.25
With cross-border IP activities assuming a more prominent role
in national economies, it is important for legislators to take crossborder scenarios into account when they design IP laws to implement
national policies. Clearly identifying how far national laws reach
should be one of legislators’ most important tasks; a clear delineation
of the reach of national laws helps businesses and individuals adjust
their conduct to comply with a country’s laws. Clarity in the reach of
national laws is, therefore, no less important for legal certainty than is
clarity in the substance of national laws.26 A presumption against extra-

24. See, e.g., Kimberley A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497
(2003); Marketa Trimble, When Foreigners Infringe Patents: An Empirical Look at the Involvement of Foreign Defendants in Patent Litigation in the U.S., 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 499 (2011); Marketa Trimble, Foreigners in U.S. Patent Litigation: An Empirical
Study of Patent Cases Filed in Nine U.S. Federal District Courts in 2004, 2009, and 2012, 17
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2014). The studies reported in the three articles
concerned patent cases, particularly patent infringement cases. Apart from IP rights infringement disputes that clearly are “IP disputes,” it is difficult to determine all the kinds
of disputes that should be covered by the term “IP disputes.” Disputes about infringements and the validity of IP rights are certainly within the category, while licensing disputes and bankruptcy proceedings involving IP are among the types of disputes whose inclusion in the category tends to be debated. This Article refers to “IP disputes” in general,
with the understanding that it refers primarily to disputes about infringement and validity.
25. The increase in the cross-border flow of IP may be inferred from the general trend
in world merchandise exports and imports: worldwide, exports increased from $59 billion
in 1948 to $17,930 trillion in 2012, and imports increased from $62 billion in 1948 to
$18,188 trillion in 2012. WORLD TRADE ORG., INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2013, at
22–23 (2013), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2013_e/its2013_e.pdf.
26. See Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Extraterritoriality, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N
ANN. MEETING PAPER, 18–19 (2011) (suggesting that in the regulatory context territorial
delineation might be even more important than substantive precision).
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territoriality can be a helpful tool that enhances the certainty of the
territorial reach of national laws; however, it is only a presumption,
and legislators’ silence about the intended territorial scope of national laws, which is prevalent in national legislation, cannot be taken to
indicate that legislators have made a deliberate choice concerning the
territorial scope of the laws that is in line with national policies.
This Article analyzes the interaction of the territorial scope of
substantive IP laws, conflict of laws rules, and a country’s physical ability to enforce its laws, and reviews the tools that legislators can utilize
to delineate the effective territorial scope of IP laws.27 Many observations made in this Article apply generally to the effective territorial
scope of any substantive laws, and some critics may argue that the
analysis should consider the problem of the territorial delineation of
substantive laws generally, without focusing on a particular area of
substantive law.28 However, concentrating on a concrete area of law
allows the analysis to demonstrate particular flexibilities that legislators may utilize to shape the effective territorial scope of substantive
laws in the area, and provide specific examples of the use of the flexibilities.

One can defend vagueness in standards that regulate primary conduct by arguing that postponing definition of legal requirements until application allows the
regulator to exploit information that was hidden at the time of the standard’s
promulgation. No such argument applies to domain rules. Uncertainty about
the applicable legal regime, as opposed to the particular rule governing primary
conduct, only encourages opportunism by persons who, after the fact, find application of a particular regime beneficial.
Id.; see also Anthony J. Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
121 (forthcoming 2014) (“The underlying objective of due process in the extraterritorial
prescriptive jurisdiction context is essentially fair notice of the law applicable to primary
conduct when and where the conduct occurs . . . .”).
27. Two notes should be made at the outset: First, this Article takes a comparative perspective; whenever possible, it provides examples of actual cases decided by courts of various countries and of rules that exist under laws at the international, regional, and national
levels, with an emphasis on U.S. legislation and case law. The cases and rules are mentioned as illustrations of the problems discussed in the Article, which does not aspire to
provide an exhaustive account of all reported cases and all existing rules related to the
problems discussed. Second, the Article focuses on horizontal conflicts, that is, one country’s IP laws vis-à-vis other countries’ IP laws, and does not discuss vertical conflicts, which
include conflicts such as international versus national, regional versus national, and federal versus state conflicts arising in a single jurisdiction. Horizontal conflicts, as opposed to
vertical conflicts, include conflicts such as country A’s federal law versus country B’s state
law, and country A’s national law versus regional law directly applicable in country B.
28. Colangelo, supra note 26, at 107 (“For too long, the phenomenon of extraterritorial jurisdiction has been addressed piecemeal in the disparate substantive fields in which
it happens to pop up.”).
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Using examples from various IP laws, Part I explains the interactions of the territorial scope of substantive IP laws, conflict of laws
rules, and a country’s physical ability to enforce its laws; the results of
the interactions define the effective territorial scope of national IP
laws, which should ideally be shaped in accordance with national IP
policies. Because the ability of conflict of laws rules to assist in advancing national IP policies may not be readily apparent, Part II proceeds by discussing the role that conflict of laws rules play in the implementation of national policies. For legislators to be able to adjust
conflict of laws rules and substantive IP laws to serve the policies, the
legislators must enjoy some flexibility to amend the rules and the laws;
Parts III and IV analyze the flexibility that is available to legislators,
and show that although some limitations are placed on countries’ legislation in the two areas of law, sufficient flexibility remains for legislators to shape the rules and laws. The flexibility can be utilized with
the assistance of various tools from the two areas of law, and Part V reviews such tools. Finally, Part VI provides two examples that illustrate
the utility of the calibration of the territorial scope of IP laws and conflict of laws rules to achieve particular national IP policy goals.
Some conflict of laws experts may object to the use of conflict of
laws rules to achieve the goals of substantive national policies (the socalled “instrumentalization” of conflict of laws rules);29 critics may insist that the rules ought to reflect solely those policies that typically affect conflict of laws rules (such as policies related to the administration of justice and the safeguarding of procedural rights). This
Article, however, suggests that conflict of laws rules have been used
instrumentally to support national substantive policies, that the rules
should contribute to the implementation of substantive policies, including IP policies, and that in the globalized world the rules are in
fact indispensable to the implementation of substantive policies.
While this Article analyzes how conflict of laws rules can be utilized in the design of the effective territorial reach of national IP laws,
it does not attempt to identify any specific national IP policies that
should be promoted, nor does it advocate for or against any specific
rights and interests that should be reflected in IP legislation. Naturally, the identification of particular policies, rights, and interests is crucial for making decisions about the content and the optimal effective
29. Cf. Jack J. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1233 (1998)
(“[I]n designing choice-of-law rules or standards, it is better to begin at the micro rather
than macro level, and to examine recurrent fact patterns and implicated interests in discrete legal contexts rather than devise a general context-transcendent theory of conflicts.”); see generally, Van Den Eeckhout, supra note 3.
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territorial scope of IP laws; however, the discussion and the selection
of the optimal policies, rights, and interests that should be reflected
in national IP laws is beyond the scope of this Article.
This Article makes four major points: (1) How far IP laws actually
reach depends not only on substantive IP law, but also on conflict of
laws rules, and countries’ physical abilities to enforce the laws; these
components delineate the effective territorial scope of national IP
laws; (2) Legislators should calibrate substantive IP laws and conflict
of laws rules to achieve the effective territorial reach that they deem
optimal;30 (3) If legislators cannot enact conflict of laws rules because
they have limited power to do so or because of other limitations (for
example, because of international instruments that mandate certain
conflict of laws rules), they should consider alternative means to influence the effective territorial reach of national IP laws; (4) At the
international level, it is unlikely that countries will achieve complete
uniformity in the effective territorial scope of IP laws: such uniformity
would require the international harmonization of both the territorial
scope of substantive IP laws and conflict of laws rules, and such harmonization is unlikely to happen in the near future.
I. THE EFFECTIVE TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAWS
Delineating the territorial reach of national laws is a complicated
exercise. The territorial scope of national laws, such as IP laws, is often equated with the territorial reach of prescriptive jurisdiction;31 the
laws are expected to apply within the country, and whether they reach
beyond the national borders of the country (whether they have an extraterritorial effect) is a decision for either legislators when they adopt
national legislation or courts when they interpret the legislation.32
Legislators sometimes do choose to formulate the intended reach of
prescriptive jurisdiction in a statute; for example, Section 271(a) of
the U.S. Patent Act defines as “infringing” the acts of making, using,
30. The optimal territorial reach might not always be the maximum possible territorial
reach, as one of the examples in Part VI infra demonstrates.
31. “[J]urisdiction to prescribe” means the power of a state “to make its law applicable
to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (1987).
International law and constitutions pose limits on the proper reach of prescriptive jurisdiction.
32. Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J.
INT’L L. 505 (1997).
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offering to sell, or selling “any patented invention, within the United
States or import[ing] into the United States any patented invention.”33 In other instances, the reach of prescriptive jurisdiction will
result from judicial interpretation; for example, Section 271(b) has
been interpreted by U.S. courts to reach those who actively induce infringement of a U.S. patent even when they act outside the United
States.34 Absent legislative language, the presumption is that national
legislators legislate solely for the territory of their own country.35
The territorial reach of prescriptive jurisdiction is not, however,
identical to the effective territorial scope of substantive laws—the territory in which the laws are truly enforced; the effective territorial scope
is usually smaller than the territorial reach of prescriptive jurisdiction.
For example, Section 271(b) intends to stop inducements of infringement of a U.S. patent, even when the acts of inducement occur
outside the United States; however, the United States will not always
succeed in actually stopping or remedying acts that occur outside its
territory, particularly if the infringer who induced patent infringement has no presence or assets in the United States. Although the
U.S. Patent Act is intended to reach activity outside the United States,
de facto the Act might not be effective in all places where such activity
might occur; the Act’s effective territorial scope is smaller than its intended territorial reach.
Whether a national law is effective outside its country—what the
effective territorial scope of the national law is—depends on three
components. The first component is the intended territorial reach of
the substantive laws as it is envisioned by legislators in their notion of
the reach of prescriptive jurisdiction, or in the interpretation by the
national courts regarding the reach of prescriptive jurisdiction.36 The
other two components are conflict of laws rules—both national rules
and the rules of other countries—and the enforcement power of
countries that may be involved in the enforcement of the laws.37 Conflict of laws rules comprise rules of jurisdiction, choice of law rules,
and rules for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments;

33. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). Cf. infra Part IV (discussing a certain degree of flexibility available in interpreting the territorial scope of this provision).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012); see, e.g., Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1302–
03 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Honeywell Int’l. Inc. v. Acer Am. Corp., 655 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D.
Tex. 2009).
35. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 31 for a definition of prescriptive jurisdiction.
37. See Goldsmith, supra note 29, at 1216 (noting that “the effective scope of [a country’s] law depends on [the country’s] ability to enforce it”).
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these rules determine when courts can adjudicate a dispute, which
country’s law the courts will apply and under what circumstances, and
whether the courts will recognize and enforce judgments rendered in
other countries.38
The enforcement power in this context means the power to
achieve compliance with the law—not just passing legislation and adjudicating violations of the law, but actually enforcing the law, which
means securing remedies and achieving compliance with the law.39

38. Some authors have argued that the court practice in the United States developed
such that, in the context of federal legislation, the analysis of extraterritoriality (the extent
of prescriptive jurisdiction) has displaced the choice of law analysis, while in the context of
state legislation, the choice of law analysis has displaced the analysis of extraterritoriality.
According to the authors, the result is that litigants who do not succeed with claims based
on U.S. federal statutes because of insufficient extraterritorial effects of the statutes (for
example, because of the strict application of the presumption against extraterritoriality)
turn to alternative claims based on state law that is easily extended extraterritorially
through choice of law. This assessment suggests that for U.S. federal statutes, choice of law
rules play a lesser role in co-defining the statute’s effective territorial scope. However,
choice of law analysis does play a role in defining the territorial reach of federal statutes
when the analysis is conducted vis-à-vis foreign-country law (that is, a party pleads foreign
law and it is a type of foreign law that a court in the United States could apply). For the
difference in defining the territorial scope of applicability of federal versus state laws see
Florey, supra note 9, at 548–49, 552–53; Colangelo, supra note 26, at 144–46. The reasons
for the prevalence of the assessment of extraterritoriality (as opposed to choice of law
analysis) for federal statutes may include, in addition to the reasons explored by Florey,
supra note 9 at 553, the fact that “the majority of [federal law] cases involve statutes, most
of which are of a public-law character.” SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 (2008). On the “public law taboo” that can prevent U.S. courts
from conducting choice of law analysis see Hannah L. Buxbaum, Remedies for Foreign Investors Under U.S. Federal Securities Law, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 174–75 (2012).
39. The term “enforcement power” is not identical to the term “jurisdiction to enforce” that was used in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1987) and
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1965). “Jurisdiction to enforce,” as defined in the Restatements, places limits on a country’s ambition to enforce its
laws and regulations. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401(c) (1987);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 6–7 (1965). As the Introductory
Note to the chapter on Jurisdiction to Enforce of the 1987 Restatement explains, the Restatement set out to resolve “uncertainty as to where reasonable pursuit of one state’s jurisdiction to enforce its law ends, and unwarranted intrusion into another state’s jurisdiction
begins.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1987), pt. IV, ch. 3, intro.
note. While “jurisdiction to enforce” sets limits on when countries may enforce their laws
and regulations (based on international law), the “enforcement power” defines when
countries can enforce their laws and regulations (based on countries’ physical abilities to
enforce).
In the 1987 Restatement, “jurisdiction to enforce” is defined as “jurisdiction . . . to induce or compel compliance or to punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations,
whether through the courts or by use of executive, administrative, police, or other nonjudicial action.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1987), § 401(c). A
Comment to the 1965 Restatement defined “jurisdiction to ‘enforce’” as
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The territorial scope of the enforcement power of a country covers
the territory in which the country is capable of enforcing its laws on
its own, without the assistance of other countries. Successful enforcement without assistance from other countries requires the presence in the country of a defendant and/or his assets, or the ability of
the country to enforce the laws against third parties whose services facilitate the defendant’s activity and who have a sufficient presence in
the country; for example, enforcement may be directed at internet
service providers or payment processors.40
An inducement example illustrates the role of conflict of laws
rules and the enforcement power in affecting the effective territorial
scope of national laws: Assume that an infringer induces the infringement of a U.S. patent through acts committed in Germany, and
that he and his assets are located in Germany. Although the U.S. Patent Act is designed to reach the infringing acts and the infringer in
Germany, without Germany’s assistance the Act will not be enforced
against the infringer because the United States has no enforcement
power in Germany. Germany might enforce U.S. laws against the infringer, but only if German courts are either willing to recognize and
enforce a U.S. judgment (based on the U.S. Patent Act) against the
infringer, or are willing to adjudicate the infringement under the U.S.
Patent Act and then enforce their judgment against the infringer.
Figures 1 and 2 below help explain the interaction of the three
types of components and demonstrate the difficulties of delineating
the effective territorial scope of national laws.41 The figures present
simplified models that involve the enforcement of the IP laws of a sinthe capacity of a state under international law to enforce a rule of law, whether
this capacity be exercised by the judicial or the executive branch, as is normally
the case in the United States, or by some other branch of government, as may be
the case in states with differing forms of government.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1965), § 6 cmt. a. On the insufficient clarity of the term in the 1965 Restatement see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the
International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 311, 434 n.105 (1979).
40. See, e.g., Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2012);
see also Goldsmith, supra note 29, at 1217.
41. Three caveats should be mentioned: First, the figures are Venn diagrams in which
the ovals portray the three components and a certain sets of scenarios; the diagrams are
not geographical maps covering any physical areas. Second, for simplification, the figures
depict the scope of the territorial reach of conflict of laws rules and the scope of the enforcement power only to the extent that the scope of the reach and the scope of the power
are relevant to the determination of the effective territorial scope of the single-country IP
law that is illustrated by the figures. Third, the diagrams are not intended to show the individual components to scale, and the sizes of the ovals and their positions in the figures
do not correspond to any measure of the territorial scope of the components.

2015]

ADVANCING NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

217

gle country (country A). Figure 1 illustrates a situation in which
country A obtains no assistance from other countries in the enforcement of its IP laws; the figure shows the interrelationships of country
A’s territorial scope of national IP laws, A’s conflict of laws rules, and
A’s enforcement power. The fact that the territorial scope of A’s IP
laws and the territorial reach of A’s conflict of laws rules (the large
oval with the dashed line) extend beyond the territorial scope of A’s
enforcement power (the small oval with the solid line) suggests that
A’s legislators have legislated for some scenarios in which A lacks enforcement power (which is not uncommon, and the inducement case
above is an example of this scenario).

The two dots in Figure 1 identify two different scenarios:42 In scenario
1, all three components are present and country A is able to enforce its IP
laws; the area where all three components overlap marks the effective territorial scope of A’s IP laws when A relies on only its own enforcement power.
In scenario 2,44 the enforcement power of country A is missing, which means
43

42. The scenarios in this section provide examples of situations that fall within the different areas of the Venn diagrams; other scenarios may also fall within these areas.
43. Scenario 1: A’s resident infringes a patent granted in A through an infringing act
committed in A. A’s courts have jurisdiction over the infringer because he is domiciled in
A. A’s courts apply A’s law to the infringing act, and A enforces the judgment against the
defendant.
44. Scenario 2: An infringer commits an act that is infringing in A but the infringer is
not domiciled or located in A and has no assets in A. A’s courts have jurisdiction over the
infringer based on the place of the tortious activity, and A’s courts apply A’s laws. However, A’s laws will not be enforced in this single-country scenario because A cannot enforce
the resulting judgment on its own. See, e.g., Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Shepperton Design Studios
Ltd., 2006 WL 6672241 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2006). In Lucasfilm, the defendant, who was
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that country A on its own, without the assistance of other countries, cannot
enforce its IP laws even though its legislators intended for its laws to apply in
that scenario.
Figure 1 presents a hypothetical model for a cross-border scenario; it
would be very unusual for a country to rely solely on its own enforcement
power when enforcing its laws; under normal circumstances, A would enjoy
some assistance from other countries. Figure 2 shows the more realistic case
of what happens when another country lends its assistance to A; Figure 2 is
another simplified model, this time involving two countries—country A and
country B—both enforcing A’s laws; the model is simplified because it is possible that more than just one country may be available to assist A in the enforcement of A’s laws.45

Figure 2 adds three gray ovals for country B to the two black ovals for
country A from Figure 1. The dashed-line gray oval represents the territorial
scope of A’s laws based on B’s conflict of laws rules; it covers all instances in
which B considers A’s laws applicable, and it is smaller than the dashed-line
black oval because country B does not consider A’s laws applicable to all instances to which country A does. The solid-line gray oval represents the territorial scope of B’s enforcement power, and the dotted-line gray oval repredomiciled in the United Kingdom, was sued in the United States (country A) for copyright
infringement, trademark infringement, and unfair competition under both federal and
state laws; the defendant committed the acts through internet pages that were accessible
from California. Id. The plaintiff sought recognition and enforcement of the resulting
default judgment against the defendant in the United Kingdom but recognition of the
U.S. default judgment was denied. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
45. In any given case the number of countries available to assist in the enforcement of
A’s laws will be limited according to the number of countries whose conflict of laws rules
and enforcement power allow them to assist in the enforcement of A’s laws.
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sents the territorial scope of the jurisdiction of B’s courts.46 The five scenarios identified in Figure 2 illustrate how the presence or absence of any of the
three components influences the enforceability—or, the effectiveness—of
A’s IP laws.47 In each of the scenarios in Figure 2, A cannot enforce its laws

46. “Jurisdiction of B’s courts” refers to adjudicatory jurisdiction, both personal and
subject-matter jurisdiction.
47. Scenario 3: A person domiciled in a third country infringes copyright in A. A’s
courts have jurisdiction over the infringer based on the place of the tortious activity; B’s
courts have jurisdiction over the infringer because he regularly conducts business in B.
However, the infringer is present in neither A nor B, and his assets are all located outside
of A and B. Because neither A nor B have enforcement power over the infringer, A’s laws
will not be enforced even though A and B agree that A’s laws apply and that A’s and B’s
courts can adjudicate the infringement.
Scenario 4: The same facts as in scenario 3 except that for some reason B’s courts will
not apply A’s laws to the infringing acts if they adjudicate the case. Because neither A nor
B have enforcement power over the infringer, A’s laws will not be enforced.
Scenario 5: A person domiciled and residing in B infringes copyright in A; A’s courts
have jurisdiction over the infringer based on the place of the tortious activity. B’s courts
have jurisdiction over the infringer because he is domiciled in B, and B also has enforcement power over the infringer who resides in B. Because the infringer is not present in A
and has no assets in A, A lacks enforcement power over the infringer. Nevertheless, A’s
laws can be enforced if B assists with the enforcement because B has enforcement power
and agrees that A’s laws apply. Regardless of whether A’s or B’s courts adjudicate the case,
A’s laws will be applied, and the resulting judgment will be enforced in B, which can enforce its own courts’ judgment or recognize and enforce a judgment by A’s courts. See, e.g.,
Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Shepperton Design Studios Ltd., 2006 WL 6672241 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26,
2006); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39 (appeal taken from Eng.); see also, supra note 44 and infra note 122. In Lucasfilm, the U.K. court (a court in country B) denied
recognition of the U.S. judgment (a judgment from country A) but allowed the case to be
relitigated in the United Kingdom under U.S. law. [2011] UKSC 39.
Scenario 6: The same facts as in scenario 5 except that for some reason B’s courts will
not apply A’s laws to the infringing acts. If B’s courts adjudicate the case, they will apply
the laws of a different country (different from A; they could be B’s own laws). If A’s courts
adjudicate the case based on A’s laws, B’s courts might not recognize and enforce the resulting judgment of A’s courts; whether or not B’s courts recognize the judgment depends
on the reasons for which B considers A’s prescriptive and/or adjudicatory jurisdiction in
the case improper. If the only reason is that B’s conflict of laws rules would direct B’s
courts to apply the laws of some other country, B’s courts will probably recognize and enforce A’s judgment even if it is based on A’s laws (as long as A’s court was the court in
which the case was first filed). If the reason is that the application of A’s laws or the
ground for exercising jurisdiction of A’s courts is against B’s public policy, then B’s courts
are unlikely to recognize the judgment of A’s courts. See, e.g., Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l. v.
Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 482 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing U.S. public policy to deny the
recognition and enforcement of a French judgment that was based on French IP law
against U.S.-domiciled defendants); see also infra notes 224 and 225.
Scenario 7: A person domiciled in a third country infringes copyright in A. A’s courts
have jurisdiction over the infringer based on the place of the tortious activity; B’s courts
have no jurisdiction over the infringer. The infringer is present in neither A nor B, and
his assets are also located outside A and B. Because A has no enforcement power over the
infringer, A’s laws will not be enforced. B cannot assist in the enforcement of A’s laws; B’s
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on its own because it has no enforcement power in those scenarios (all five
scenarios are outside the black solid-line oval that represents A’s enforcement power). However, once A enjoys B’s assistance, the effective territorial
scope of A’s IP laws becomes larger than it was when A had to rely on only its
own enforcement power; in scenario 5 and in some circumstances also in
scenario 6, A’s laws may now be enforced with the assistance of country B.48
It is apparent from Figure 1 that the effective territorial scope of a
country’s substantive laws, such as IP laws, does not correspond to the territorial scope of the laws as intended by the country’s legislators (the black
dashed-line oval). But the effective territorial scope is also not confined to
the territorial scope of the country’s own enforcement power (the black solid-line oval); as Figure 2 shows, assistance by other countries may enlarge the
effective territorial scope of a country’s substantive laws beyond the territorial scope of the country’s own enforcement power.
While the effective territorial scope of substantive laws results from the
interaction of the three types of components, legislators cannot adjust all of
the components. The territorial scope of the enforcement power seldom
changes in its territorial scope; absent some changes in the territory of the
country or in the ability of the country to control its territory (for example,
changes occurring because of the cessation or occupation of a part of the
territory), the territorial scope of the enforcement power typically remains
constant. A country also has limited, if any, ability to affect other countries’
conflict of laws rules; while legislators can adjust their country’s own conflict
of laws rules, they cannot legislate conflict of laws rules for other nations.49
Without the ability to influence the territorial scope of the enforcement
power and foreign countries’ conflict of laws rules, legislators are left with
only two of the three components that they can adjust to achieve the optimal
effective territorial scope of substantive laws: the territorial scope of the
country’s substantive laws and the country’s conflict of laws rules. It will be
in these two components where legislators must search for tools that can be
used to make the desired territorial adjustments, and it will be these two
components that legislators need to mutually coordinate to achieve the intended effective territorial scope of substantive laws.
As for the conflict of laws rules of other countries, an international treaty would be required for countries to influence conflict of laws rules interna-

courts have no jurisdiction over the infringer and B also has no enforcement power over
the infringer.
48. Because of B’s assistance, A can count on its laws being enforced in scenario 5,
and, under certain circumstances, A’s laws will also be enforced in scenario 6. See supra
note 47 for the explanation of the necessary circumstances in scenario 6. Therefore, scenarios 5 and 6 demonstrate the potential for the expansion of the effective territorial
scope of A’s laws. A’s laws remain unenforced in scenarios 3, 4, and 7 even when B is involved.
49. See infra Part III on the potential effects that foreign countries’ laws and practices
may have on conflict of laws.
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tionally and set a single standard for the rules.50 It will be incumbent upon
legislators to evaluate how much their inability to affect foreign conflict of
laws rules limits their success in defining the effective territorial scope of
their own national laws with sufficient precision and certainty. An agreement at the international level on conflict of laws rules might be a necessary
next step for countries to take if legislative success in delineating the territorial scope of national laws is insufficient.

II. THE ROLE OF CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES IN PROMOTING NATIONAL
POLICIES
It may seem that conflict of laws rules have no role to play in the implementation of national policies; however, conflict of laws rules and national policies do interact, and they do so on two levels. First, conflict of laws
rules implement national policies that are inherent in the conflict of laws
field, such as policies that concern the administration of justice, predictability, uniformity of results, legal certainty, and procedural fairness—policies
that typically affect procedural rules. Second, conflict of laws rules define
when national law applies; and therefore the rules de facto “legislate” substantive law in a given case and influence when national policies (in this case
“substantive policies”—those that are implemented primarily in substantive
laws) are promoted.51
At the level of interaction that concerns substantive policies, conflict of
laws rules interact with such policies in two different ways. First, conflict of
laws rules may be designed so that their application requires courts to take
into consideration the content of substantive laws and thus the substantive
policies that underlie the policies. The interest analysis52 developed by the

50. So far, countries have not agreed on a large-scale conflict of laws treaty. See The
Judgments Project, supra note 14, and the discussion in Part III on limited conflict of laws
treaties and regional conflict of laws instruments.
51. The effects of choice of law rules on the territorial scope of substantive laws have
long been recognized. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the
Federal Courts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732, 734 (1963) (“[The courts’] decisions
[about choice of law] have in effect determined, for the particular case and similar cases
presenting a like pattern of conflicting rules, the reach of the respective state laws.”); Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady
Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2012) (“[C]hoice-of-law rules set the scope of state law.”).
This aspect of the interaction is reflected in the application of the Erie doctrine in the
United States; because of the impact that conflict of laws rules can have on the substantive
outcome of court decisions, the rules are handled as substantive and not procedural for
Erie doctrine purposes. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)
(citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)); see also Colangelo, supra note 26, at
141 (“Choice-of-law analyses that select U.S. forum law to regulate foreign conduct effectively produce extraterritorial exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction.”).
52. Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U.
CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958); see also, e.g., SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OFLAW REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS: TODAY AND TOMORROW 14–24, 38 (2006).

222

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:203

American choice of law revolution is an example of a choice of law approach
that requires courts to assess the substance of the potentially applicable laws
and evaluate the respective states’ interests in promoting the policies.53 The
“better law” approach,54 another product of the American choice of law revolution, requires that courts compare substantive solutions adopted in the
competing laws as one of the factors whose weighing leads to the selection of
the applicable law. The American choice of law revolution was not the first
wave of scholars in choice of law who were concerned about the substance of
the potentially applicable laws; many centuries before the revolution, the
medieval Statutists also sought answers to choice of law questions in the substance of applicable laws.55
Whether the application of conflict of laws rules should deliberately
lead to the promotion of certain substantive policies has been debated. The
scholars who contend that substantive policies should not influence the application of conflict of laws rules have searched for conflict of laws rules that
would be neutral vis-à-vis the content of the substantive laws and the national
policies that the laws implement.56 But even these scholars advocating substance-neutral rules sometimes have yielded to certain substantive policy considerations; for example, in 1842, Carl Georg von Waechter suggested an exception to the rule of lex fori (which he advocated for torts) “in favor of a
defendant who injured a foreign plaintiff in the latter’s own country which
53. See also Paul Edward Geller, Conflicts of Laws in Cyberspace: Rethinking International
Copyright in A Digitally Networked World, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 571, 574–78 (1996)
(distinguishing between “categorical analysis” and “functional analysis” of choice of law
issues).
54. Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1584, 1587–88 (1966); see also SYMEONIDES, supra note 52, at 51.
55. Statutists furthered “the concept that applicable law must be determined by looking at the spatial reach of a certain rule of substantive law” by answering the question “over
which (cross-border) legal situations does it claim application?” MIREILLE M.M. VAN
EECHOUD, CHOICE OF LAW IN COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE LEX
PROTECTIONIS 25 (2003); see also MARTIN WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 29–30 (2d
ed. 1950). Magister Aldricus (in the twelfth century) suggested that “the judge should apply that law which seems to him the better and more useful.” Id. at 22. Because of their
focus on the promotion of substantive policies similar to the method of promotion used by
the Statutists, adherents to the interest analysis and other modern approaches have been
referred to as “neo-Statutists.” See TH. M. DE BOER, BEYOND LEX LOCI DELICTI: CONFLICTS
METHODOLOGY AND MULTISTATE TORTS IN AMERICAN CASE LAW 5 (1987); VAN EECHOUD,
supra, at 28.
56. See, e.g., JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935);
FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, AND THE LIMITS OF
THEIR OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PLACE AND TIME (1972). On the “functionalist” approach to conflict of laws (the approach according to which “choice-of-law rules should be
attuned to the achievement of decisional harmony only”) and the “conflicts justice” approach (the approach according to which choice-of-law rules should promote “a neutral
kind of justice, or justice on a supranational plane”), see Th. M. De Boer, Facultative Choice
of Law: The Procedural Status of Choice-of-Law Rules and Foreign Law, 257 RECUEIL DES COURS,
290–93 (1996).
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refuses a remedy”57—an exception that appeared to be guided by a preference for a certain substantive policy.
The second way in which conflict of laws rules interact with substantive
policies leads national policies to impact directly the design of conflict of
laws rules.58 As De Boer explains, in these types of rules, “the function of
substantive law has been translated into a connecting factor that refers to the
legal environment of the party whose interests the forum has at heart.”59 For
example, pro-consumer policies implemented in consumer protection laws
may find their reflection in conflict of laws rules concerning choice of court
agreements concluded in consumer contracts60 and in the rules for choice of
national law that applies to such contracts.61
The increasing proliferation of conflict of laws rules evidences a trend
in which conflict of laws rules are designed with specific substantive policies
in mind; special conflict of laws rules emerge that are designed for certain
areas of law and for certain issues, and that are tailored to the policies that
define the particular areas and issues.62 Intellectual property has not been
excepted from this trend. Although IP-specific conflict of laws rules have
been legislated only recently and only in some countries,63 courts have developed IP-specific approaches to the application of general conflict of laws
rules for decades.64 This early de facto conflict of laws rules proliferation in
the area of IP occurred under the influence of strong policies that have underpinned national IP laws and the international IP law system.65
57. 3 ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG AND ERIK JAYME, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
COMPARATIVE TREATISE ON AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS LAW, INCLUDING THE
LAW OF ADMIRALTY 65–66 (1977).
58. Historically, the development that led to the designing of rules that reflect substantive policies evolved from the same dissatisfaction with the content-neutral approach
to choice of law that propelled the American choice of law revolution. See, e.g., De Boer,
supra note 56, at 293–97.
59. Id. at 295.
60. Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 22, at art. 19.
61. Council Regulation 593/2008, of the European Parliament and of Council of 17
June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, art. 6, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6
[hereinafter Rome I Regulation].
62. See DE BOER, supra note 55, at 53 (“Increasingly, normative notions inherent in a
legal system’s substantive law are transplanted to its choice of law rules, gradually changing
the blunt features of the neutral allocation method.”). On the trend of “instrumentalisation” of conflict of laws, see also, generally, Van Den Eeckhout, supra note 3, and Goldsmith, supra note 29. Some conflict of laws rules have been so tightly intertwined with substantive policies that the rules have appeared in substantive laws; Part III demonstrates
examples of such “mixed rules,” in which conflict of laws rules are embedded in substantive laws and used to promote particular substantive policies.
63. See infra Part V for the discussion of IP-specific conflict of laws legislation.
64. See infra Part V for examples of court-developed IP-specific conflict of laws rules
and approaches.
65. See infra Parts III and IV for the policies that have defined national and international IP law.
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The proliferation of conflict of laws rules reflects the recognition that
the rules do play a significant role in promoting national IP policies. National policies on IP continue to differ among countries notwithstanding the
significant degree of agreement that countries share on many of the policies;
the agreement has led to harmonization of national IP laws at the international level through a number of international treaties.66 A typical example
of countries’ disagreement on IP policies is the exhaustion doctrine;67 a
country that relies heavily on imports may prefer the rule of international
exhaustion that facilitates competition in imports68 while a country that is a
strong exporter may prefer the rule of national exhaustion that allows IP
right holders to price discriminate and protect the domestic market from an
influx of cheaper parallel imports.69 Guided by the desire to become the future global center of the software industry a country may adopt copyright
ownership rules to facilitate corporate ownership of copyright in software70
and provide for sui generis protection of non-copyrightable aspects of databases.71 A desire to protect authors and original copyright owners as weaker
parties against those who license or acquire their copyrights and benefit
from a later increase in the value of the copyrights may prompt countries to
adopt measures that enable the authors and original copyright owners to renegotiate the transfers or licenses of their copyrights.72
66. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.
9, 1896, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99–27 (1986) (as revised at Paris July 4, 1971 and amended
Sept. 28, 1979) [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris
Convention]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. The most important IP treaties, such as
the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, and the TRIPS Agreement, have been widely
adopted. Regionally, an even greater degree of agreement has led to the adoption of regional instruments that harmonize various aspects of IP law.
67. Under the exhaustion doctrine, the IP right “owner’s initial authorized transfer of
a copy of the work [or product] exhausts the owner’s right to control the distribution of
that copy [or product].” R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV. 577, 580 n.7 (2003); see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 6
(recognizing countries’ disagreement on the exhaustion issue). In U.S. copyright law the
exhaustion doctrine is known as the “first sale doctrine.” 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
68. Under the rule of international exhaustion, the first authorized sale of a copy or a
product anywhere in the world exhausts the IP rights in the protecting country.
69. Under the rule of national exhaustion, the first authorized sale of a copy or a
product exhausts the IP rights in the protecting country but only when the sale occurs in
the protecting country.
70. See infra Part V for further discussion of this example.
71. See, e.g., Council Directive 96/9/EC, of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of
Databases, arts. 7-12, 1996 O.J. (L 077) 20.
72. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) (addressing the termination of transfers and licenses granted by authors); URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ [UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9,
1965, BGBI at 1273, arts. 32–32b, as amended Jan. 10, 2013 (Ger.); see also infra Part V for
further discussion of this example.

2015]

ADVANCING NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

225

Even when countries agree on IP policies generally, the policies can still
play out differently in specific cases. Because IP rights that require registration are protected only in the countries where the rights are registered (for
example, registered trademarks) or granted (for example, patents), the relevance of particular national IP policies to a particular mark or invention varies based on whether the IP right is registered in the country or not. Even
when rights vest automatically for multiple countries, as happens in the case
of copyright and well-known marks,73 the rights may be subject to different
national IP policies in individual countries. For example, countries may
agree that cinematographic works should enjoy copyright protection,74 but
the countries may vary in their notions of whether and how copyright should
serve to support their own domestic film industry.75
The implementation of the exhaustion principle in copyright law in the
United States exemplifies U.S. legislators’ failure to identify and implement
national IP policies for the transnational context. Court decisions concerning the exhaustion rule in cross-border copyright cases, such as Quality King
Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc.,76 Omega S.A. v. Costco
Wholesale Corp.,77 and Kirtsaeng,78 show courts struggling to locate any sign in
the legislation or the legislative history of Congress’ consideration of crossborder scenarios and implementation of national IP policies in the transnational context. The legislators’ silence in this instance is not unique; so far,
legislators in only some countries have paid attention to designing IP rules
for cross-border scenarios and to reflecting IP policies in conflict of laws
rules.

III. A COUNTRY’S FLEXIBILITY IN DESIGNING ITS CONFLICT OF LAWS
RULES
If conflict of laws rules are to serve to implement national IP policies,
the rules must be sufficiently flexible to allow countries to fine-tune the rules
according to the needs of the countries’ policies. Rigid rules would affect
the implementation of national policies and not allow countries to shape the
rules to accomplish policy goals. As this Part explains, conflict of laws rules
are not rigid but are subject to various factors that constrain their design and
application. This Part reviews these constraints and argues that despite the
limitations caused by the constraints, countries maintain some degree of flexibility when designing and applying conflict of laws rules.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See infra note 109.
Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 2(1).
See infra Part VI for further discussion of this example.
523 U.S. 135 (1998).
541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010).
133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
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There are four sources of limitations on countries’ discretion to formulate their national conflict of laws rules.79 First, international treaty obligations may dictate that countries adopt certain rules; this source also includes
bilateral treaties and regional instruments that may limit or direct countries’
choices in setting their conflict of laws rules. Second, comity, which is not
formulated in international treaties but is an internationally recognized
principle, impacts how countries design and apply their conflict of laws rules.
Third, inter-country cooperation (for example, in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments) is a source of limitations on the operation
of a country’s conflict of laws rules, which are confined de facto by other
countries’ willingness to accept a country’s territorial ambitions, whether
those ambitions are expressed in conflict of laws rules or in any other of a
variety of norms. Finally, higher laws in a country’s national hierarchy of
laws may limit a country’s discretion in formulating its national conflict of
laws rules; for example, conflict of laws rules are typically subject to national
constitutional principles.

A. International Treaties and Regional Instruments on Conflict of Laws
At the international level no large-scale conflict of laws treaty yet exists;
the Hague Conference on Private International Law failed to produce a treaty on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
that would apply generally to civil and commercial matters.80 The Hague
Conference’s work in the 1990s and early 2000s resulted in a limited Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which has not yet entered into force.81
If the reopened Hague Conference’s Judgments Project82 bears fruit in the
form of a large-scale treaty, the treaty will limit countries’ flexibility in designing their national rules on jurisdiction and in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
At the regional level, the flexibility of some countries in the conflict of
laws area has already been curtailed to some extent. The European Union
(“EU”) (and through the extension of its legislation, the larger European
Economic Area) has rules for jurisdiction of national courts, choice of law,
and the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments from other EU

79. On sources of limitations on countries’ discretion to formulate their national conflict of laws rules see, e.g., EHRENZWEIG, supra note 57, at 27–42.
80. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
81. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 30 June 2005, available at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98 (last visited Sept. 26,
2014). The Convention applies only to business-to-business agreements, and excludes IP
matters to a certain extent from the Convention’s scope. For a discussion of the Convention’s applicability to IP matters, see Stefan Luginbuehl & Heike Wollgast, IP Rights in the
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR JOCHEN PAGENBERG
(Dietrich Beier, et al. eds., 2006) 321–49.
82. See supra note 14.
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member states.83 Within the scope of these instruments, EU member states
are not free to adopt whatever conflict of laws rules they may desire; they
must follow the rules in the EU instruments, which are directly applicable
under EU law.84
Although no large-scale international treaty binds all countries—or
even a majority of them—in the conflict of laws area, there is one internationally recognized principle that should guide all countries in designing
and applying rules of conflict of laws: the principle of comity.85 The U.S. Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot86 defined the “comity of nations” as “the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.”87 In its operation, “the
principle of comity promotes the notion that [when appropriate] a court will
[apply foreign law and] enforce a foreign court’s decision today with the expectation that the foreign court will reciprocate when the situation reverses
in the future.”88 Each country’s legislators and courts assess the appropriateness of the reflection of comity in their own particular provisions and decisions based on a consideration of other countries’ practices and their own
expectations as to what the practices ought to be.89 Although comity places
limits on countries’ leeway in the conflict of laws area, the principle is flexi-

83. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, revised in Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 2007, 2009 O.J. (L 147) 5 [hereinafter Lugano II Convention]; Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December, 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 35, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1
[hereinafter Brussels I Regulation]; Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of Parental Responsibility, 2003 O.J. (L 338) 1;
Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July
2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40 [hereinafter Rome II Regulation]; Brussels Convention, supra note 22; Rome I Regulation, supra
note 61; Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 22.
84. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 171, art.
288.
85. For a historical overview of the understanding of “comity” in the United States and
a criticism of the current concept of “comity” see Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11 (2011).
86. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
87. Id. at 164.
88. MARKETA TRIMBLE, GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT
165 (2012). Notwithstanding this expectation, which is inherent in the operation of the
comity principle, comity is not necessarily linked to the principle of reciprocity.
89. Justice Story explained that “[e]very nation must be the final judge for itself, not
only of the nature and extent of the duty, but of the occasions on which its exercise may be
justly demanded.” JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 32 (1841).
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ble, and countries interpret it to allow space for implementation of their national policies.

B. Other International Treaties and Regional Instruments
In addition to international law and principles specific to the conflict of
laws area that impact the design of national conflict of laws rules, international treaties and principles arising in other areas of law may also mandate
how conflict of laws rules must be designed and applied. For example, Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affects conflict of laws
rules because it requires countries to ensure “effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating fundamental rights.”90 These requirements have implications for national rules of jurisdiction and choice of
law, and may specifically affect the rules with respect to IP because Article 17
of the Declaration concerns property, presumably including IP.91
International IP treaties, which are another example of treaties that influence the design of conflict of laws rules, include very few conflict of laws
rules per se.92 For example, Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention is sometimes cited as the key choice of law rule in international copyright;93 according to the provision “the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress
afforded to the author to protect his rights [under copyright], shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed.”94
Some commentators argue that the provision calls for the application of a
particular choice of law rule (the law of the protecting country or the law of
the forum), at least for copyright infringements,95 while others view Article
5(2) not as a choice of law provision but as “essentially no more than a rule
barring discrimination against foreign right holders, which requires a coun90. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 8, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec 10, 1948).
91. Id. at art. 17. For a discussion of human rights documents’ coverage of IP by provisions on property see Silke von Lewinski, Intellectual Property, Nationality, and NonDiscrimination, a Document Prepared for the Panel Discussion to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary
of
the
Universal
Declaration
of
Human
Rights
(Oct.
20,
1998),
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=7609; Christophe Geiger, Intellectual “Property” after the Treaty of Lisbon: Towards a Different Approach in the New European Legal Order?, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 255 (2010); Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human
Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971 (2007).
92. 2 SAM RICKETSON, JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND §§ 20.17–20.28, at 1292 (2d
ed. 2005) (“[D]eriving from the Berne text supranational choice of law rules is a delicate,
if not improbable, operation.”). Graeme Dinwoodie refers to this source as “public private
international intellectual property law.” Dinwoodie, supra note 2.
93. Berne Convention, supra note 66.
94. Id. at art. 5(2).
95. See, e.g., RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 92, § 20.08, at 1297–98. Cf. William
Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 409 (2000) (“Berne
has no general choice of law directive on ownership . . . .”).
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try to apply the same law to works of foreign origin as it applies to works of its
own nationals.”96
While it has been debated whether or not Article 5(2) of the Berne
Convention is a choice of law provision, the meaning of Article 14bis(2)(a) of
the Berne Convention for the choice of applicable law appears to be unequivocal; according to the provision, copyright ownership in cinematographic works “shall be a matter for legislation in the country where protection is
claimed.”97 In the case of this rule, as in the case of Article 5(2), it remains
an open question whether it is a rule leading directly to the choice of applicable law, or whether the rule allows for the application of renvoi98 and therefore allows courts in “the country where protection is claimed” to apply their
jurisdiction’s choice of law rules to determine applicable law based on those
rules.99 While the first interpretation would mean that the Berne Convention would dictate a particular choice of law rule that countries have to
adopt, the second interpretation would give countries freedom to design
their own choice of law rule.
Regional IP instruments that are directly applicable in countries in a
region100 typically contain conflict of laws provisions that address various ver-

96. E.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT:
PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 129 (2010). For a discussion of the debate about the
proper interpretation of the national treatment provision in Berne, see STRÖMHOLM, supra
note 2, at 21 (“[I]t cannot be denied that both the mention of the law of the country
where protection is claimed and the prohibition of discrimination in Art. 5 do imply a reference in principle to a certain legal system—a reference which comes close, both in form
and in function, to the rules of private international law.”); see also Robert Brauneis, National Treatment in Copyright and Related Rights: How Much Work Does It Do? 27 (GW Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
2013-103,
2013),
available
at
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications/810/?utm_source=scholarship.law.g
wu.edu%2Ffaculty_publications%2F810&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverP
ages. For similar provisions to Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, see WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 5(3), Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 105-17 (1997),
2186 U.N.T.S. 203; Beijing Treaty of Audiovisual Performances in Beijing, art. 5(3), June
24,
2012,
AVP/DC/20,
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/avp_dc/avp_dc_20.pdf (not yet in
force as of Sept. 28, 2014) (providing for the law of the country “where protection is
claimed” as the law applicable to “[t]he means of redress” for violating the moral rights of
authors and performers); Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 6bis(3). Additionally,
Article 5(3) of the Berne Convention provides that “[p]rotection in the country of origin
is governed by domestic law.” Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 5(3).
97. Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 14bis(2)(a).
98. Renvoi means “refer back or refer away” and it “occurs when the forum applies a
foreign choice-of-law rule that selects law different from that chosen by the forum’s rule.”
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 103 (6th ed. 2010).
99. On renvoi and the Berne Convention see Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 322.
100. See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents of 5 October 1973, 1065
U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter European Patent Convention] (The European patent is often
described as a bundle of national patents.); Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1 (in effect since 1994, cod-
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tical conflicts that may arise in a single territory between the regional law
that the instruments create and coexisting national laws; however, the instruments also include rules for horizontal conflicts between the regional law
and national laws of countries outside the region, and conflicts among the
national laws of countries within the region to the extent that the national
laws are applicable within the regime of the regional IP instruments. For example, Article 60(1) of the European Patent Convention includes a rule for
choosing the national law that will determine the right to a European patent,101 and Article 64(3) addresses choice of law for infringements.102 Similarly, regulations establishing unitary EU-wide rights—the EU Trademark
Regulation103 and the EU Design Regulation104—contain rules for “jurisdiction and procedure in legal actions relating” to the unitary rights105 and for
the choice of applicable law.106
In addition to the few conflict of laws rules per se that are included in
international IP treaties and regional instruments on IP, the treaties and instruments include other provisions that are not conflict of laws rules per se
but that affect the design and operation of conflict of laws rules. The principle of territoriality of IP rights,107 which permeates IP laws at all levels, influences the design and application of conflict of laws rules. The principle of
territoriality means that IP rights exist only under a single country’s law and
the protection of the rights under the law extends only to places where the
law reaches. The principle is clearly apparent, for example, in provisions
concerning the independence of individual national patents and trademarks
on patents granted and trademarks registered in other countries.108 Even in
ified in Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community
Trade Mark, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1) [hereinafter EU Trademark Regulation]; Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community Designs, 2002 O.J. (L 3) 1 (in
effect since 2002) [hereinafter EU Designs Regulation].
101. European Patent Convention, supra note 100, art. 60(1). The rule is accompanied
by the Protocol on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Decisions in Respect of the Right to
the Grant of a European Patent, October 5, 1973, available at http://www.epo.org/lawpractice/legal-texts/html/epc/2013/e/ma4.html.
102. European Patent Convention, supra note 100, art. 64(3). The rule calls for the
application of “national law” to “[a]ny infringement of a European patent.” Id.
103. EU Trademark Regulation, supra note 100.
104. EU Designs Regulation, supra note 100.
105. EU Trademark Regulation, supra note 100, at Title X; EU Designs Regulation, supra note 100, at Title IX. Disputes concerning these rights are adjudicated by special
courts established by individual EU member countries. EU Trademark Regulation, supra
note 100, at art. 95; EU Designs Regulation, supra note 100, at art. 80.
106. EU Trademark Regulation, supra note 100, at arts. 98 and 101.1; EU Designs Regulation, supra note 100, at arts. 83 and 88.1. The national courts apply the substantive law of
the regulations, and for matters not covered by the regulations, national courts “apply
[their] national law, including [their] private international law.” EU Trademark Regulation, supra note 100, at art. 101.2; EU Designs Regulation, supra note 100, at art. 88.2.
107. See supra Part III.
108. Paris Convention, supra note 66, at arts. 4bis(1) and 6(3).
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cases of rights that enjoy recognition in multiple countries because of international treaties (such as literary and artistic works under the Berne Convention, and well-known marks under the Paris Convention and the TRIPS
Agreement),109 the rights exist on a country-by-country basis with national
differences attached to the rights in national legislation (for example, rules
of protectable subject matter in copyright and rules for when a mark is considered well-known in the country of enforcement). It is an extension of the
territoriality principle that countries typically select the rule of lex loci protectionis (the law of the protecting country) or lex loci delicti (the law of the place
of tort) for the choice of law applicable to infringements of IP rights.
Conflict of laws rules are also affected by the principle of national
treatment110 and the most-favored-nation principle.111 The principle of national treatment is the defining feature of IP treaties, which were initially negotiated to overcome the protectionism of countries that led some of them
to protect the IP of only their own nationals.112 The principle of national
treatment requires that countries treat foreigners (those who enjoy protection of their IP under the treaties because of a connecting factor)113 in the
same manner as or no worse than the countries treat their own nationals.114
The most-favored-nation principle was imported into IP from trade treaties;
the principle requires that all foreigners be treated equal to whichever foreigners are receiving the best treatment.115 For conflict of laws rules the
principles mean that, as among litigants whose IP is protected under a treaty
because of a connecting factor, national conflict of laws rules in IP disputes
are not permitted to distinguish among litigants based on their nationalities
109. Berne Convention, supra note 66, at arts. 2(6); Paris Convention, supra note 66, at
art. 6bis; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 16(2).
110. Paris Convention, supra note 66, at art. 2; Berne Convention, supra note 66, at arts.
5(1) and 5(3); Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971, art. II,
25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178; International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations, arts. 4–6, Oct. 26,
1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 3; North American Free
Trade Agreement, art. 1703, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993); WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, supra note 96, at art. 4. See also GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra
note 96, at 99–112.
111. TRIPS, supra note 66, at art. 4; see also GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 96,
at 112–14.
112. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN FRIEDRICH JAEGER, UEBER ERFINDUNGS-PATENTE 35 (1840);
FELIX DAMME, DAS DEUTSCHE PATENTRECHT 26 (1906); RICHARD GODSON, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS AND OF COPYRIGHT 296 (1840). Some
countries even discriminated against their own nationals if the nationals opted for protection of their IP in another country.
113. “Foreigners” may include persons domiciled in other countries—parties to the
Convention. See Paris Convention, supra note 66, at art. 3.
114. See, e.g., Paris Convention, supra note 66, at art. 2(1); Berne Convention, supra
note at, at art. 5(1). For an analysis of the current limited role of the principle of national
treatment in intellectual property treaties see Brauneis, supra note 96.
115. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 4.
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if a different treatment of litigants would lead to the violation of the principles.116
International treaties and regional instruments that require countries to
provide for remedies for infringements of IP rights also influence conflict of
laws rules; the provisions can be interpreted to mandate the adoption of specific solutions for jurisdiction and choice of law.117 For example, Article 8 of
the EU Information Society Directive instructs EU member countries to
“provide appropriate sanctions and remedies in respect of infringements of
the rights and obligations set out in [the] Directive,”118 and each member
country must “take the measures necessary to ensure that rightholders whose
interests are affected by an infringing activity carried out in [the member
state’s] territory can bring an action for damages and/or apply for an injunction and . . . seizure.”119 This language of the Directive suggests that an EU
member country must provide for the jurisdiction of its courts based on the
place of the tortious activity, and that the law of the country must apply to
“an infringing activity carried out in [the country’s] territory.”120
116. Of course countries may be bound by other international obligations that also
prevent the countries from distinguishing among litigants; in particular, human rights
treaties may prohibit discrimination in general. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, supra note 90, at art. 7; Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra
note 84, at art. 18; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 21, 2000
O.J. (C 364) 13.
117. Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 16; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at
art. 41.1; North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 110, at art. 1714–1718; WIPO
Copyright Treaty, infra note 169, at art. 14; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
supra note 96, at art. 23.
118. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May
2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art. 8.1, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10.
119. Id. at art. 8.2.
120. Id. Provisions of the EU IPR Enforcement Directive could be interpreted similarly
except that one of the Directive’s recitals explicitly states that the Directive “does not aim
to establish harmonised rules for judicial cooperation, jurisdiction, the recognition and
enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial matters, or deal with applicable law.”
Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on
the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Preamble, Recital 11, 2004 O.J. (L 195)
16 [hereinafter EU IPR Enforcement Directive]. However, the language of the recital
does not mean that the Directive has no influence on national conflict of laws rules; rather, the recital evidences the concern of EU drafters about a potential dispute over the
legal basis for the Directive and the required type of legislative procedure, which led the
drafters to emphasize the IP-centered focus of the directive (the legal basis and the legislative procedure were different at the time for IP legislation and for legislation concerning
judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters).
It is important to recall that the EU IPR Enforcement Directive was adopted at a time
when an ongoing dispute existed between the European Commission and the Council
about EU competences in certain criminal law matters. The dispute was settled by the
Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, 2005
E.C.R. 7879. The dispute affected the negotiations of the EU IPR Enforcement Directive.
On clashes of “[t]raditional private international law and EU law” see generally, Ralf
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C. National Laws and Policies Limiting Conflict of Laws Rules
The reactions of other countries in actual cases are evidence of the tangible guidelines that exist for a country’s conflict of laws rules because assistance from other countries is often necessary for the proper functioning of
the rules.121 Assistance is not limited to the recognition and enforcement of
a judgment; the country will also need other countries to assist in matters
such as service of process and the securing of evidence. Failure to obtain assistance from other countries does not necessarily mean that the country
must amend its conflict of laws rules to make the rules acceptable to other
countries or better reflect practices in those countries; however, the actions
of other countries will influence the country’s evaluation of its law, including
its conflict of laws rules, with the result that the law or conflict of laws rules
might be judged as ill-conceived if the rules consistently result in unenforceable decisions. Therefore, countries’ levels of acceptance of each other’s
conflict of laws rules influence, and to a certain degree dictate, the design of
national conflict of laws rules.
Examples, including examples from the area of IP, exist where reactions to countries’ conflict of laws rules suggested that the rules were not acceptable to other countries. For example, in Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth,122
the U.K. Supreme Court explained that there are limits to the grounds of jurisdiction of U.S. courts that U.K. courts will view as acceptable when U.K.
courts decide whether to recognize and enforce judgments issued by U.S.
courts.123 In Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Abdullah Ali Bahattab,124 reacting to an
ongoing foreign court proceeding concerning a U.S. patent, a U.S. court
warned that it would ignore any foreign decision concerning the validity of a
U.S. patent, thus rejecting a foreign court’s jurisdiction to decide the validity

Michaels, EU Law as Private International Law? Re-conceptualizing the Country-of-Origin Principle
as Vested Rights Theory, (Duke Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research
Paper
No.
122,
2006),
available
at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2280&context=faculty_schol
arship.
121. As illustrated in Part I, a country can successfully enforce its laws without assistance
from other countries only if the country has enforcement power over the defendant or a
related third party; as long as the defendant and/or his assets (or the third party and/or
his assets) are located in the country, the country’s court decisions can be enforced directly against the defendant or against the third party. See Goldsmith, supra note 29, at 1217.
Of course, a country may be successful in seeing its laws respected by a defendant voluntarily; for a discussion of examples of reasons for a defendant’s voluntary compliance, see,
e.g., Marketa Trimble, Cross-Border Injunctions in U.S. Patent Cases and Their Enforcement
Abroad, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 331, 345–46 (2009).
122. Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39 (appeal taken from Eng.); see also
supra note 47 (describing scenario 5).
123. Id.
124. Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Abdullah Ali Bahattab, No. 07–1771, slip op. (D.D.C.
Aug. 14, 2009).
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of a U.S. patent.125 To what extent these types of reactions will affect a foreign country’s decisions on its own conflict of laws rules will depend on various factors, including the political and economic strength of the country and
the country’s relations with the countries from which the reactions originate.
Finally, national laws that are higher in the hierarchy of laws than conflict of laws rules, including national constitutions and constitutional principles, may limit conflict of laws rules. National constitutions typically contain
guidelines for rules of civil procedure, including rules for conflict of laws.126
For example, in the United States, the federal Constitution includes three
provisions that have been found to impact conflict of laws rules directly: the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV (for state-to-state conflicts within
the United States),127 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,128 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.129
In other countries, interpretations of constitutional provisions impose similar
limitations on conflict of laws rules.
As demonstrated in this Part, countries are confined in their formulations and applications of conflict of laws rules; however, the confines are often very general and still provide leeway for countries to adjust their conflict
of laws rules according to national policies, including IP policies.130 To the
extent that countries are not bound by existing international and regional
instruments, the countries are also free to adopt conflict of laws rules that
are specific to certain areas of law or types of activities, including IP law, IP
licenses, and IP infringements. However, the delineation of the effective territorial scope of IP laws does not stand on conflict of laws rules alone; the delineation depends also on the design of the territorial scope of IP laws.131

IV. A COUNTRY’S FLEXIBILITY IN DESIGNING ITS INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAWS
Countries are limited in their exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction by
customary international law, which permits the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction based on five internationally accepted grounds—“territoriality, na-

125. Id.
126. On the interaction of constitutional law and conflict of laws rules see, e.g., Ayelet
Ben-Ezer & Ariel L. Bendor, Conceptualizing Yahoo! v. L.C.R.A.: Private Law, Constitutional
Review, and International Conflict of Laws, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089 (2004).
127. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra note 98, at 691–716.
128. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra note 98, at 655–90.
129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra note 98, at 716–21.
130. See supra Part II for a discussion of how conflict of laws rules are designed to implement national policies, including substantive policies, such as IP policies.
131. See supra Part I.
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tionality, the protective principle, passive personality, and universality.”132 At
least one of these five grounds must be present for a country to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction in the area of intellectual property law. However, the
grounds can be interpreted broadly133 and there is usually nothing to prevent countries from exceeding the general limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction that these grounds mandate.134
Notwithstanding the vagueness of general limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction, other limitations on countries’ designs of the territorial scope of
their substantive IP laws exist, and these limitations emanate from the same
types of sources as the constraints on conflict of laws rules: international and
bilateral treaties, regional instruments, internationally recognized principles,
and laws that stand higher in a country’s hierarchy of laws than do IP laws.
Additionally, other countries’ IP laws may also affect the design of national
IP laws. Of course, other factors can influence decisions about national IP
legislation. Arguments for particular choices in IP legislation arise from political, social, cultural, historical, and economic rationales, and policymakers
may contend that the arguments mandate certain legislative choices; for example, they may argue that an economic analysis suggests only one reasonable legislative solution to a problem. This Part leaves aside these other factors that may be perceived as limitations and focuses on factors that delineate
the fixed outer boundaries of national IP legislation.135

132. CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 184 (2013); see
also Teresa Scassa & Robert J. Currie, New First Principles? Assessing the Internet’s Challenges to
Jurisdiction, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1017, 1025–28 (2011).
133. BRADLEY, supra note 132, at 186 (“Although effects-based jurisdiction is generally
accepted, its proper scope is unclear.”).
134. Id. at 185; see infra note 177 and accompanying text for more on constitutional
limits that countries have in their national constitutions; see supra Part III for a discussion
of comity; see also, infra, notes 177–179 and accompanying text for a discussion of foreign
countries’ reactions in particular cases to the intended extraterritorial effects of IP laws.
135. Naturally, drawing a line between fixed outer boundaries and other factors is difficult; a conclusion in an economic analysis may be no less objective and unequivocal than a
mandatory minimum standard in an international treaty, and the same political, social,
cultural, historical, and economic rationales that affect national legislation may also play a
role in international treaty negotiations. The assumption is that legislators can ignore the
other factors, but they are bound by the fixed outer limit factors even though legislators
may and occasionally do choose to ignore international treaty obligations, just as they may
decide to ignore a conclusion in an economic analysis when they make national law. This
Part focuses on the outer limits of the design of IP laws, which are presented here as limitations that national legislators should respect; the limits are relatively fixed and are very
difficult to change.
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A. The National Treatment Principle, the Most-Favored-Nation
Principle, and the Territoriality Principle
The principle of national treatment and the most-favored-nation principle,136 on which international treaties concerning IP are built, affect the
design of national legislation, including the design of the legislation’s territorial reach. As long as a connecting factor exists to the treaties that include
the principles, national laws must provide certain rights and remedies to foreigners and thus have a territorial reach to wherever the foreigners may be.
For example, the first publication of a photograph in a Berne Convention
country, such as Germany, will result in the photograph’s being protected
under the Berne Convention even if its author is not a national of a Berne
Convention country, such as a national of Afghanistan (a country that is not
a party to the Berne Convention).137 Because of the principle of national
treatment, Germany must provide to the Afghan photographer at least the
same rights with regard to the photograph as it would to a German photographer.138 As a result, German copyright law must be designed to provide
the reproduction right with regard to the photograph,139 even if the right
benefits an author who is an Afghan national who resides outside of Germany. Naturally, the right protected by German law will concern only acts of
reproduction that are protected by German law; this protection is consistent
with the territoriality principle, another internationally recognized principle
that affects the territorial reach of national IP laws.
It would seem that the principle of territoriality140 should have the
greatest effect on the territorial reach of national IP laws; the principle
sounds as if it should prevent any extraterritorial reach of national IP legislation. In fact, though, the principle requires only that a country limit its legislating within the scope of the country’s own prescriptive jurisdiction; as suggested earlier in Part I and discussed later in this Part, the country’s
prescriptive jurisdiction can nevertheless extend de facto beyond the physical
borders of the country.141

B. Minimum Standards
In addition to the national treatment, most-favored-nation, and territoriality principles, international treaties (and also bilateral treaties and regional instruments) provide for minimum standards that countries must

136. See supra Part III.B. for an explanation of the two principles.
137. Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 3(1)(b).
138. Id. at arts. 5(1) and 5(3).
139. Id. at art. 9(1) (defining the right of reproduction as “the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of [literary and artistic] works”).
140. See supra Part III.B. for an explanation of the principle of territoriality.
141. GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 96, at 95.
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meet in their IP legislation.142 The degree to which minimum standards
provisions set limits on national legislation varies. Some provisions, such as
provisions concerning the term of copyright,143 are unequivocal and countries may not deviate from the standard except to increase the term of protection above the minimum. In some countries, provisions of this nature in
international treaties are considered directly applicable (self-executing),
meaning that they automatically become integral parts of the national legal
order and national courts can apply them even without corresponding national implementing legislation.144
Some minimum standard provisions provide for a goal that must be
achieved but leave it upon national legislation to implement measures that
will achieve the goal. For example, Article 16 of the Berne Convention
mandates that countries provide for the seizure of infringing copies but
leaves it upon national legislation to set the rules for seizures.145 The concept of goal-setting provisions also exists in regional instruments: EU directives set goals for national legislation to achieve.146 In goal-setting provisions,
freedom to select the mode of implementation allows a certain flexibility for
countries as they adopt laws to comply with minimum standards.
Additional leeway for national lawmaking exists because some minimum standards provisions are flexible. For example, some provisions are optional,147 while other provisions allow for exceptions from minimum standards under certain conditions.148 In some instances countries may deposit
notifications, reservations, and declarations in which they declare their in142. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 1(3) for information on explicit mandatory minimum standards.
143. Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 7; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art.
12.
144. See, e.g., Merck Genericos v. Merck & Co. and Merck, Sharp, & Dohme, (2007)
41(5) IIC 614, 616 (2010) (Port.) (“Art. 33 TRIPS is precise and unconditional, prerequisites for its direct application.”); see also infra note 146 (noting that in the EU, the direct
applicability of EU instruments corresponds to the concept of self-executing treaty provisions). Cf. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 161 (2d Cir. 2007) (“TRIPs is plainly
not a self-executing treaty.”).
145. Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 16(3).
146. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 84, at art. 288. In
the EU, directives are used to harmonize national IP laws; regulations set EU-wide law for
EU unitary rights—the Community trademark and the Community design, for example.
See EU Trademark Regulation, supra note 100; EU Designs Regulation, supra note 100.
Some EU law provisions may be directly applicable even if they are included in EU instruments other than regulations.
147. For example, Article 2(4) of the Berne Convention leaves it upon national
legislation to specify the copyright protection of “official texts of a legislative,
administrative and legal nature.” Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 2(4).
148. For example, Article 10(2) of the TRIPS Agreement excepts countries from the
obligation to provide for the rental right in cases of cinematographic works “unless such
rental has led to widespread copying of such works which is materially impairing the
exclusive right of reproduction.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 11.
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tent to divert from certain treaty provisions.149 Also, international treaties
may allow flexibilities to countries for which implementation of minimum
standards provisions presents particular hardships.150
Flexibility in interpretation is also important for countries’ options in
national IP lawmaking, whether the flexibility is actually intended by treaty
negotiators or not. An example of an intended interpretative flexibility is
the flexibility that allows countries to define their rule of exhaustion; Article
6 of the TRIPS Agreement, which acknowledges countries’ disagreement on
the issue, leaves it upon each country to decide for itself whether it wishes to
adopt the principle of national exhaustion or the principle of international
exhaustion.151 Other instances of flexibility in interpretation may not have
been anticipated or planned, or sometimes even desired by international
treaty negotiators, but flexibility exists either because there is no effective
dispute resolution mechanism to lead to unity in interpretation, or because
countries tolerate the interpretative flexibility in a given case.152
Notwithstanding the flexibilities mentioned in the previous paragraphs,
minimum standards provisions in international treaties do provide certain
limits to national lawmaking, including some limits on the territorial reach of
national IP laws. However, the provisions’ main objective is to secure mini-

149. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 66, at arts. 13(1) and 14bis(3); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 96, at art. 15(3); TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 66, at arts. 3(2) and 14(6). But cf. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 96, at art. 21. This Part leaves aside instances in which “flexibility” results from
countries not meeting their international obligations. Some countries may feel free to ignore provisions of international treaties, particularly if the international enforceability of
the provisions is limited. For example, Article 6bis of the Berne Convention is specifically
excluded from being incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by Article 9(1) of the TRIPS
agreement. Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 6bis; TRIPS Agreement, supra note
66, at art. 9(1).
150. The 1971 Appendix to the Berne Convention containing Special Provisions Regarding Developing Countries, and Article 66 of the TRIPS Agreement delaying implementation requirements in the least-developed countries are examples of such arrangements. Berne Convention, supra note 66, app.; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 66.
151. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 6; see supra notes 68 and 69 for the principles of international and national exhaustion Once the IP right is exhausted, the right
holder cannot control the disposition of the product any further (at least not based on the
right holder’s IP rights). The exhaustion principle is known in U.S. law as the first sale
doctrine. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). Regional instruments may limit countries’
abilities to choose. For example, under EU law, EU countries must adhere to the principle
of EU-wide exhaustion for IP rights. First Council Directive of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 89/104, art. 7, 1988
O.J. 1, 6 (EC).
152. For example, the prohibition against formalities in Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention has been interpreted in the United States as not affecting certain formality requirements maintained by the U.S. Copyright Act even after the United States became a
party to the Berne Convention. Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 5(2). Although
some countries may disagree with the interpretation adopted by the United States, they
may decide not to object to the U.S. interpretation.
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mum standards in the territory of each country, and only isolated provisions
address a national law’s intended territorial reach. For example, Article
5quater of the Paris Convention calls for a certain extraterritorial reach of national patent law; it instructs countries to grant rights to a patentee with regard to an imported product that was manufactured abroad by a process that
is protected in the importing country.153 Contrary to this call for extraterritorial reach in national patent laws, Article 5ter of the Paris Convention limits
the territorial reach of national patent laws within the borders of each country when it excludes from the infringement of national patent rights the use
of certain patented products on vessels, aircraft, and land vehicles that are
temporarily present in the country.154

C. Localization
Some minimum standard provisions allow countries significant leeway
in delineating the territorial reach of their national IP laws because the provisions do not address the localization of operative facts.155 For example, Article 28(1) of the TRIPS Agreement includes “offering to sell” among the activities that a patent owner has the exclusive right to prevent, but the
provision does not specify whether both the offer and the sale, or only one or
the other, must occur in the country where the patent was granted.156 As a
result, countries differ in their territorial delineation of infringing “offers to
sell” a patented invention. For example, under German law any offer made
in Germany—but not outside Germany—to sell a patented product infringes
the German patent, whether the sale is intended to occur inside or outside of
Germany.157 In the United States, however, at least under the current interpretation adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, an
offer made anywhere in the world—even outside the United States—
infringes the U.S. patent, but the intended sale must occur inside the United
States.158 Even when an international treaty provision seems unambiguous
about where a patent infringing act must occur, countries may differ in their
approaches to the localization of acts and therefore to the territorial reach of

153. Paris Convention, supra note 66, at art. 5quater. In the United States, Section
271(g) of the Patent Act corresponds to this provision and extends U.S. patent rights to
cover a patented process even when the process has been run outside the United States—
as long as the products manufactured through the process are being imported into the
United States. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2012).
154. Paris Convention, supra note 66, at art. 5ter. In the United States, Section 272 of
the Patent Act corresponds to this provision. 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2012).
155. On differences in localization in copyright cases see, e.g., Geller, supra note 2, at
335–36.
156. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66 at art. 28(1).
157. Reichsgericht, I 137/33, Jan. 13, 1934, RGZ 29, 173; Kreuzbodenventilsäcke, Bundesgerichtshof, I ZR 109/58, Mar. 29, 1960, 1960 GRUR 423.
158. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.,
617 F.3d 1296, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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the implementing provision; for example, countries may localize the place of
a patent infringing sale differently, such as the place of a “free on board”
sale,159 or a sale that occurs through the internet.160
An expansive approach to localization will contribute to a territorial expansion of national IP laws; such an expansive approach can concern the localization of all operative facts and not just the facts related to acts of infringement. The place of publication is an example. If U.S. courts deem the
publication of a work viewable on the internet from within the United States
to occur in the United States regardless of where the work at issue was uploaded to the internet, such treatment has implications for the territorial
reach of U.S. copyright law.161 This localization of the act of publication
means that any work first published on the internet in a manner that allows
for the work to be viewable in the United States162 will cause the work to have
the United States as the country of origin under the Berne Convention.163
Making works to be “works . . . first published in the United States”164 further
means that the works are covered by the U.S. Copyright Act even though
their authors are not U.S. nationals, U.S. domiciliaries, or other eligible persons.165 Additionally, to the extent that some countries’ courts may apply the

159. For a definition of “free on board,” see The Incoterms® Rules (2010),
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (ICC), http://www.iccwbo.org/products-andservices/trade-facilitation/incoterms-2010/the-incoterms-rules/ (last visited Sept. 28,
2014) (“‘Free On Board’ means that the seller delivers the goods on board the vessel nominated by the buyer at the named port of shipment or procures the goods already so delivered. The risk of loss of or damage to the goods passes when the goods are on board the
vessel, and the buyer bears all costs from that moment onwards.”).
160. See Colangelo, supra note 26, at 118 for a discussion of using localization to domesticate acts and on “differing conceptualizations of the geographic coverage of U.S.
law.” “[B]y localizing the cross-border crime to the aspect that touches U.S. territory, the
United States purports to exercise territorial jurisdiction.” Id.
161. See, e.g., Kernal Records OY v. Mosley, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (holding that the publication of an American company-owned song on the internet in Australia
constituted simultaneous publication in the United States, and was therefore subject to
U.S. copyright laws); see also Thomas F. Cotter, Toward a Functional Definition of Publication
in Copyright Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1724, 1747–50 (2008). Cf. Rogers v. The Better Business
Bureau of Metropolitan Houston, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 722, 730 (S.D. Tex. 2012)
(“[U]ploading webpages to the internet does not constitute publication as a matter of
copyright law . . . .”). But cf. Moberg v. 33T LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 415 (D. Del. 2009) (holding that the publication of photographs on the internet in Germany did not constitute
simultaneous publication in the United States).
162. The accessibility of a work on the internet from a particular territory can be limited through the use of geolocation tools. See, e.g., Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 567, 586–99 (2012).
163. Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 5(4)(a).
164. 17 U.S.C. § 104(b)(2) (2012).
165. Id. § 104(b)(1) (making works published by “a national or domiciliary of the United States, or . . . a national, domiciliary, or sovereign authority of a treaty party, or is a
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law of the country of origin when determining copyright ownership166 (and
to the extent that these courts would agree with U.S. courts’ localization of
the place of publication), the approach expands the application of U.S. law
to issues of copyright ownership even beyond U.S. borders.167

D. Secondary Liability
International treaties do not address matters of secondary liability for IP
infringement, a type of liability that typically results in the extraterritorial
reach of national IP laws.168 Nevertheless, some provisions in international
treaties could arguably be interpreted as providing for rules of secondary liability. For example, Article 9(1) of the Berne Convention, which provides
for the “exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of . . . works,” could
be interpreted as covering either an act of direct infringement in the form of
authorizing (within the protecting country) an act of reproduction (that may
occur anywhere), or an act of secondary infringement that appears in the
form of authorizing (anywhere) an act of reproduction that should occur
within the protecting country.169
The latter possible interpretation of Article 9(1) of the Berne Convention coincides with the approach that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit adopted in Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.;170
the court noted that when Congress included the act of authorization in the
U.S. Copyright Act (to comply with the requirements of the Berne Convention), Congress “intended to invoke the preexisting doctrine of contributory
infringement.”171 This interpretation limited the extraterritorial reach of the
“authorization” provision; viewing the “authorization” provision as an outgrowth of the doctrine of contributory infringement means that an “authoristateless person” subject to U.S. copyright laws). The interpretation also has implications
for the formalities required under the U.S. Copyright Act.
166. See, e.g., Código Civil [Portuguese Civil Code], Decreto-Lei No. 47344/66, art. 48
(1966). Until recently, French courts applied the law of the country of origin to determine copyright ownership; however, under a 2013 ruling of the French Supreme Court
the law of the protecting country applies to copyright ownership matters. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 1e civ., April 10, 2013, Bull. civ. I, No. 1112508 and 11-12509 (Fr.).
167. Also, if other countries’ courts agree with the U.S. approach, works will enjoy
Berne Convention protection in other Berne Convention contracting countries because
the United States becomes the country of origin under the Berne Convention. See also
Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 269–71.
168. See, e.g., TRIMBLE, supra note 88, at 110–16.
169. Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 9(1); see also WIPO Copyright Treaty, art.
6(1), Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 96, at arts. 7, 11. Alternatively, the provision
could be interpreted as requiring that both the act of authorization and the act of reproduction be committed in the same protecting country.
170. 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).
171. Id. at 1092.
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zation” is only infringing when the authorized acts would infringe the U.S.
Copyright Act, meaning that the authorized acts would occur within the
United States.172 An authorization that occurred in the United States but
concerned acts that would occur abroad does not infringe the Act under this
interpretation.173
Notwithstanding this example of an instance in which a court interpreted the Berne Convention provision as if it provided for a secondary liability
rule, international IP treaties do not expressly include provisions on secondary liability, so it is left up to countries to define secondary liability, including
its territorial reach.

E. National Laws and Policies Limiting IP Rules
Countries look to each other’s national IP legislation and sometimes to
each other’s behavior, which may affect a country’s own lawmaking. The
behavior of other countries in IP lawmaking may matter, for example, when
the lawmaking concerns an issue that international treaties tie to the principle of reciprocity. The “rule of the shorter term” in Article 7(8) of the Berne
Convention is de facto a reciprocity provision: a country will protect a work
for as long as the country’s own term of protection if the work’s country of
origin provides for a term of protection of at least equal duration.174 If the
work’s country of origin provides for a shorter term of protection, the shorter term governs.175 Under the pressure of reciprocity, a country may be
compelled to evaluate its shorter term of protection because works for which
the country is the country of origin are deprived of longer terms of protection in other countries.176
Foreign countries’ reactions in particular cases to the intended extraterritorial effects of IP laws also inform countries about the acceptability of
such effects.177 For example, in one case a Japanese court refused to apply
U.S. law to acts of inducement of a U.S. patent that were committed in Japan; the court invoked the public policy exception to justify the refusal and

172. Id. at 1092–94; see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243
F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (confirming that U.S. courts have subject matter
jurisdiction over acts committed outside the United States that induce copyright infringement within the United States).
173. Subafilms, Ltd., 24 F.3d at 1094.
174. Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 7(8).
175. Id.
176. This may be a case for “soft-harmonization,” where a country’s legislators and
“courts, after appraising themselves of foreign law, may adopt or be influenced by that law
if they find it persuasive.” Holbrook, supra note 6, at 582.
177. Sometimes it is the anticipation of possible reactions by foreign countries that
guides courts’ analyses. E.g., Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1097 (“Extraterritorial application of
American law would be contrary to the spirit of the Berne Convention, and might offend
other member nations by effectively displacing their law in circumstances in which previously it was assumed to govern.”).
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stated that “[t]o order prohibition of the act of actively inducing infringement of a U.S. patent and destruction of the infringing goods located in Japan by applying the U.S. Patent Act is contrary to the meaning of [public
policy].”178 Another expression of displeasure with extraterritorial effects of
the U.S. Patent Act was recently included in the Amicus Brief that the Danish
government submitted in the Transocean Offshore case; the Danish government called the application of U.S. patent law to the conduct that occurred
in Norway “an unwanted and unprecedented intrusion into the regulation of
conduct within foreign sovereigns’ own territory.”179
Finally, national laws that stand higher in the hierarchy of laws than IP
laws set limits on national IP laws, as do regional instruments if the instruments enjoy a higher position in the hierarchy of national laws. The higher
laws may include constitutional principles; some provisions are general,
while some are IP-specific. Provisions concerning property in general, such
as Article 14 of the German Constitution, are interpreted as covering IP.180
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution is an example of an IP-specific
provision; it provides for a goal and the means of pursuing the goal, which
guides copyright and patent lawmaking in the United States.181 Article 17(2)
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union simply states
that “[i]ntellectual property shall be protected,”182 thereby clarifying that the
protection for property in general, which is included in Article 17(1), also
applies to IP. Some authors argue that the territorial reach of prescriptive
jurisdiction in the United States is subject to due process scrutiny under the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.183
Although countries certainly face constraints when they design national
IP legislation, the constraints are limited and still afford a significant degree

178. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 26, 2002, 56 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ
[MINSHŪ], 1551 (Fujimoto v. Neuron Co. (Card Reader)), available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=619. See also Masato Dogauchi, Private
International Law on Intellectual Property: A Civil Law Overview, WIPO/PIL/01/8 10–11
(2001).
179. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark in Support of
Petitioner, at 1, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA,
Inc., 617 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010), August 9, 2013.
180. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Basic Law], May 23,
1949, BGBI. XIV (Ger.).
181. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
182. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, infra note 116, at art.
17(2).
183. See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 26, at 122 (“[D]ue process regulates the exercise of
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction and, at the very least, demands that the extraterritorial application of U.S. law not be ‘arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.’”); BRADLEY, supra
note 132, at 194–95; see also Bradley on the application of the Charming Betsy canon of
statutory construction that should promote the application in the United States of the customary international law on prescriptive jurisdiction, albeit only as an interpretative tool.
BRADLEY, supra note 132, at 186.
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of flexibility. This flexibility is also available to national legislators when they
delineate the territorial reach of national IP laws.

V. CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
With countries enjoying a significant degree of flexibility when designing the territorial scope of national IP laws and a certain degree of flexibility
when designing conflict of laws rules, national legislators can utilize tools
from the two areas of law to adjust the effective territorial scope of national
IP laws so that the effective scope reflects national IP policies. As Part IV
demonstrated, various possibilities remain open for countries to adjust the
territorial scope of IP laws—flexibility in interpretation of minimum standards, flexibility in localization of operative facts, and flexibility in the setting
of rules for secondary liability are included in the toolboxes that are available
to national legislators. Legislators, to the extent that they can legislate conflict of laws rules, should also utilize the rules to adjust the effective territorial scope of national IP laws;184 if legislators cannot legislate conflict of laws
rules (for example in a case when regional instruments dictate conflict of
laws rules) they must seek other avenues to introduce provisions in IP laws
that will affect the application of conflict of laws rules in a manner that will
lead to the desired outcomes. This Part reviews IP-specific conflict of laws
rules that emanate from legislation and case law and also identifies the alternatives to conflict of laws legislation that legislators can use to adjust the effective territorial scope of IP laws.

A. IP-Specific Conflict of Laws Legislation
Some countries have opted to adopt IP-specific conflict of laws rules.
Rules of jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments have all appeared with IP-specific regulation. Rules of jurisdiction can include IP-specific provisions to address the problems of jurisdiction over issues of the validity of registered and granted IP rights, such as
trademarks and patents.185 In some countries, the principle that the validity
of foreign-registered and foreign-granted IP rights will not be entertained is
expressed in statutes on jurisdiction. For example, in the EU member countries a regulation on jurisdiction provides for exclusive jurisdiction “in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks,

184. See supra Part I for a discussion of the implementation of national policies
through conflict of laws rules.
185. Generally, courts refrain from deciding the validity of foreign-registered and foreign-granted IP rights out of respect for the sovereignty of the foreign country that registered or granted the rights; the act of state doctrine has been invoked in the United States
to justify U.S. courts’ refusals to decide cases in which the validity of foreign-registered and
foreign-granted IP rights are at issue. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 904 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
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designs, or other similar rights required to be deposited or registered.”186
Jurisdiction in these proceedings is reserved to “the courts of the Member
State in which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken
place or is under the terms of an instrument of the Union or an international convention deemed to have taken place.”187
While EU rules of jurisdiction provide an example of rules concerning
jurisdiction over the validity of registered IP rights, the Swiss Federal Act on
International Private Law is an example of a conflict of laws statute that contains a special provision on jurisdiction in cases of IP infringement. Other
national laws rely on general provisions for general jurisdiction based on factors such as a defendant’s domicile or a defendant’s seat, or specific jurisdiction for tort cases, such as the place of the tortious activity or the tortious activity’s effects. Article 109(2) of the Swiss Act does not depart from this
typical framework but stipulates specifically that in IP infringement cases the
Swiss courts of the defendant’s domicile or usual dwelling have jurisdiction.
Additionally, Swiss courts have jurisdiction based on the place of the tortious
activity or the place of the effects of such activity, or based on the activities of
the defendant’s offices if they are registered in Switzerland.

186. Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 22, at art. 24, para.4.
187. Id. The interpretation of the provision’s predecessor, Article 22(4) of the Brussels
I Regulation, supra note 83, has been the subject of numerous disputes. See, e.g., Case C4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, 2006 E.C.R. I-06509; Case C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, 2006
E.C.R. I-06535. The same provision also applies in the larger European Economic Area.
Lugano II Convention, supra note 83, at art. 22(4).
Other national conflict of laws statutes contain rules on jurisdiction specific to IP cases as well. For instance, the Japanese act concerning international jurisdiction provides for
exclusive jurisdiction in some IP cases; according to Article 3-5(3), Japanese courts have
exclusive jurisdiction in matters of “the existence and effect of an intellectual property
right” that is registered in Japan. Act for the Partial Amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Civil Interim Relief Act, 2011, art. 3-5, para. 3 (Japan), translated in KOJI
TAKAHASHI, JAPAN’S NEW ACT ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION (2011). A commentary
notes that general grounds of jurisdiction apply in actions for infringements of intellectual
property rights. KOJI TAKAHASHI, JAPAN’S NEW ACT ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION 9
(2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189684. Other
national statutes are more comprehensive in their IP-specific jurisdictional rules; for example, one of the IP-specific provisions in the Swiss Federal Act on International Private
Law provides for international exclusive jurisdiction and also details a rule for jurisdiction
among national courts. Article 109(1) of the Swiss Act provides for the jurisdiction of
Swiss courts in disputes concerning the validity and registration in Switzerland of intellectual property rights. If the defendant in such a dispute is domiciled in Switzerland the
courts in the place of domicile have jurisdiction; if the defendant is not domiciled in Switzerland, then the courts in the place of domicile of the defendant’s registered Swiss representative have jurisdiction, or, if there is no such representative, then the courts in the seat
of the Swiss authority that registered the IP right at issue have jurisdiction. BUNDESGESETZ
ÜBER DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT [IPRG], Dec. 18, 1987, as last amended, July 1,
2013, art. 109, para. 1 (Switz.).
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IP-specific rules for choice of law exist, for example, in the Swiss Federal
Act on International Private Law,188 which provides in Article 110(1) that IP
rights are governed by the law of the country “for which protection . . . is
sought”;189 presumably, this provision covers both issues of ownership and
infringement. In Poland, the Act on Private International Law190 addresses
IP ownership and other issues separately from IP infringement issues; according to Article 46 of the Act, the law of the country in which an IP right is
exercised governs the creation, content, and termination of the right, and
also its transfer and issues of priority.191 Additionally, Article 47 of the Polish
Act sets the law applicable to an employment relationship as the law governing any IP that arises from the employment relationship.192
For infringements of IP rights, countries typically select the law of the
protecting country, which corresponds to the principle of territoriality of IP
rights.193 Choice of law governing the infringement of IP rights is addressed
specifically in the Polish Act on Private International Law, according to
which the law of the protecting country governs the protection of the
right.194 The Chinese Law of the Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relations of the People’s Republic of China sets the law of the country
where protection is claimed as the law applicable to infringement.195 Some
countries have taken an interesting step to promote party autonomy by allowing litigating parties to agree—after an IP infringement has occurred—on
the law that will apply to the infringement. The Swiss Federal Act and the
Chinese Law allow parties to agree, after an infringement has occurred, that
the law of the forum will apply to the infringement of IP rights.196

188. IPRG, art. 109, para. 1 (Switz.).
189. Id. at art. 110, para. 1.
190. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Feb. 4, 2011), O.J. 2011 No. 80, item 432, arts. 46–
47 (Pol.).
191. Id. at art. 46, para. 1–2.
192. Id. at art. 47. In China, according to the Law of the Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relations of the People’s Republic of China, the “ownership and contents” of IP rights are governed by the law of the country in which protection is sought.
Law of the Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relations of the People’s Republic
of China (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the 11th Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct.
28, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2011), art. 48 (China). In Portugal and Belgium conflict of laws
rules distinguish between rules applicable to copyright (the author’s right) and industrial
rights (such as trademarks and patents).
193. See supra Part III for a discussion of the principle of territoriality.
194. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Pol.), at art. 46, para. 3.
195. Law of the Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relations of the People’s
Republic of China, at art. 50.
196. IPRG (Switz.), at art. 110, para. 2; Law of the Application of Law for ForeignRelated Civil Relations of the People’s Republic of China, at art. 50. Parties to an infringement dispute may achieve the same result in legal systems that have facultative
choice of law. Facultative choice of law exists in legal systems where courts do not have an
obligation to conduct ex officio a choice of law analysis and/or forum law applies unless
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IP-specific rules concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments on IP are rare; typically, general rules on recognition and
enforcement apply to foreign judgments on IP. The Swiss Federal Act on International Private Law is one example of national legislation that specifically
addresses the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments on IP; the
Act provides in Article 111 that foreign judgments on IP will be recognized
only if the country in which the judgment was issued is either (a) the country
where the defendant is domiciled, or (b) the country of the place of the tortious activity or the place of the effects of such activity and the defendant is
not domiciled in Switzerland.197 According to Article 111, foreign decisions
concerning the validity or registration of IP rights will be recognized if the
country in which the judgment was issued is the country for which protection
was sought, or if the decision was recognized there.198

B. Court-Created IP-Specific Conflict of Laws Rules
When legislation does not provide IP-specific conflict of laws rules,
courts may develop such rules. The situation in the United States is an appropriate example because personal jurisdiction statutes and statutes on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments include no IP-specific
rules, nor do choice of law rules address IP issues specifically. Two U.S. court
decisions exemplify the development of IP-specific rules and approaches in
the United States. The first decision, which concerns the jurisdiction of
courts in cases concerning foreign patents, is a 2007 decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The decision clarified that, although U.S. courts may have personal jurisdiction over a defendant in cases
that concern non-U.S. patents, supplemental jurisdiction cannot be used as
the basis for U.S. court subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving foreign patents.199
The second U.S. decision that exemplifies how courts create conflict of
laws rules for IP concerns the choice of law applicable in copyright cases.200

parties invoke and/or plead and prove applicable foreign law. De Boer, supra note 56, at
269.
197. IPRG (Switz.), at art. 111, para. 1.
198. Id. at art. 111, para. 2.
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012); Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007). It is
unclear whether the court foreclosed any jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts in cases involving foreign patents; since 2007 at least one federal district court has interpreted the decision to allow U.S. federal courts to exercise diversity jurisdiction in cases involving foreign
patents in which the validity of the foreign patents is not contested. Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Third Dimension (3D) Semiconductor, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D. Me.
2008).
200. Itar-Tass Russ. News Agency v. Russ. Kurier Inc., 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998). Although the decision is binding only in the Second Circuit, the choice of law approach has
also been followed in other circuits. See, e.g., Edmark Indus. SDN. BHD. v. S. Asia Int’l
(H.K.) Ltd., 89 F. Supp. 2d 840, 843–44 (E.D. Tex. 2000); Lahiri v. Universal Music & Vid-
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In a 1998 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit established an approach to choice of law in copyright cases.201 First, the court
performed a dépeçage202 and divided the issues of copyright ownership and
copyright infringement for the purpose of conducting a choice-of-law analysis.203 Second, the court articulated and applied different rules to the copyright ownership and the copyright infringement;204 because the court was
deciding a federal question case, it derived the rules from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.205 For copyright ownership, the court looked to “the
law of the [country] with ‘the most significant relationship’ to the property
and the parties” as provided in the Restatement (Second) for property in general, and rejected any determination of which country’s law would apply
based on the rule of the “country of origin” included in the Berne Convention.206 For copyright infringement, the court applied the lex loci delicti
rule—the rule that calls for the application of the law of the country in which
the tort took place.207
As shown in Voda and Itar-Tass, courts are certainly capable of creating
IP-specific rules and developing approaches for the application of general
conflict of laws rules to IP cases. The question is whether courts are in the
best position to develop rules and approaches in a manner that is consistent
with the promotion of national IP policies; legislators, as the policy makers
and drafters of legislation that should meet national IP policy goals, should
be better positioned than courts to see the entire picture and craft conflict of
laws while respecting the goals of current national IP policies. Of course,
proposals for special conflict of laws rules for IP cases that have been prepared by several expert groups208 can now assist courts when they develop IP-

eo Distribution, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1176 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Saregama India Ltd.
v. Mosley, 635 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2011).
201. Itar-Tass Russ. News Agency, 153 F.3d 82.
202. Dépeçage means “applying the rules of different states to determine different issues.” Willis L. M. Reese, Dépeçage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L.
REV. 58, 75 (1973).
203. Itar-Tass Russ. News Agency, 153 F.3d at 90.
204. Id. at 90–92.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 90. At the same time, the court pointed out the limitation on standing to sue
for copyright infringement; under the U.S. Copyright Act, only an owner of an exclusive
right may file a copyright infringement suit. Id. at 91. One author concluded that by applying the Restatement (Second) rule “the United States has effectively adopted a lex originis
rule on copyright authorship.” Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 731.
207. Itar-Tass Russ. News Agency, 153 F.3d at 91. Although the Restatement (Second) departed from the earlier strict territorial approach that generated rules such as the lex loci
delicti rule, the court still chose to apply the lex loci delicti rule and explained that in this
case the result would have been the same under the rule of the Restatement (Second), which
calls for an evaluation of several factors, because the country of the place of the tort was
also the country of defendant’s domicile. Id.
208. See supra notes 10–11 and the accompanying text.
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specific conflict of laws rules and approaches; some courts have already
turned to these proposals for guidance,209 and extensive commentaries to
some of the proposals help courts understand the effects that the proposed
conflict of laws rules might have.210 Even with the assistance of the expertise
contained in the proposals, it is unrealistic to expect courts to design IPspecific conflict of laws rules and approaches that will fully incorporate current national IP policies.

C. Alternatives to IP-Specific Conflict of Laws Legislation
There might be various reasons for which legislators cannot legislate
conflict of laws rules or amend conflict of laws rules without limitations. In
such instances, legislators may resort to alternatives to legislating conflict of
laws rules. One alternative is to embed the rules in IP legislation. There are
examples of this alternative in existing IP legislation; for instance, the U.S.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act,211 in the section that limits the liability of
internet service providers for content posted on the internet by others, imposes an obligation on a subscriber (an alleged infringer) who objects to a
copyright holder’s notification of infringing activity to include in a counternotification “a statement that the subscriber consents to the jurisdiction of
Federal District Court for the judicial district in which [his] address is located, or if [his] address is outside of the United States, for any judicial district
in which the service provider may be found.”212 The Act thus solves the
problem of personal jurisdiction over an objecting subscriber who might
otherwise be outside the reach of U.S. courts. Similarly, the U.S. Patent Act
solves the problem of possible lack of personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts
over nonresident owners of U.S. patents;213 according to Section 293 of the
Patent Act, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has jurisdiction over a nonresident patentee if the patentee did not designate a
person residing within the United States for the purpose of service of process, or if the patentee designated such a person but the person cannot be
found.214
Some national IP laws may also include a choice of law rule that accompanies a substantive mandatory rule;215 this so-called “internationally manda-

209. See supra note 16.
210. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING
JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2007); EUR.
MAX PLANCK GRP., supra note 10.
211. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
212. Id. § 512(g)(3)(D).
213. 35 U.S.C. § 293 (2012).
214. Id.
215. Joost Blom, Public Policy in Private International Law and Its Evolution in Time, 50
NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 373, 382 (2003). These so-called “mandatory rules” “are, in
effect, laws that include their own, unilateral choice of law rules.” Id.
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tory rule” is designed to override general choice of law rules because a court
must apply the rule even when choice of law rules instruct the court to apply
another country’s law.216 Mandatory rules are useful for expressing strong
national public policies, and legislators and courts resort to them in special
situations where national policies outweigh concerns about comity.217 For
example, German legislators used mandatory rules for the provisions of the
German Author’s Rights Act concerning equitable remuneration to authors.218 According to Sections 32–32B of the Act, an author of a work is entitled to equitable remuneration, which may be adjusted during the lifetime
of a contract to assure that the remuneration remains equitable, and if the
parties do not agree on the amount of the remuneration a court may determine the amount for them.219 Section 32B makes the provisions on equitable remuneration mandatory; parties cannot deviate from the provisions in
their contracts, and the provisions apply “in so far as the contract [at issue]
concerns substantial use in the territory governed by [the German Copyright
Act].”220 Therefore, even if German choice-of-law rules instruct a German
court to apply foreign law to a contract the court will apply the provisions of
the German Author’s Rights Act to the issue of equitable remuneration. The
status of a provision as a mandatory rule will not always arise from an explicit
designation in legislation; in some instances the status will develop through
court interpretation. In France, the rule according to which moral rights are
inalienable under French authors’ rights is a provision that courts (in
France) have interpreted as a mandatory rule.221

216. See Rome I Regulation, supra note 61, at art.9(1) (“Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the
law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation.”); Code de Droit International
Privé
[C.D.I.P.]
art.
20
(Belg.),
translation,
available
at
http://www.ipr.be/data/B.WbIPR%5BEN%5D.pdf (“[M]andatory or public policy provisions, . . . by virtue of the law or their particular purpose, are aimed to govern the international situation irrespective of the law designated by the conflict rules.”); Blom, supra note
215, at 379 (mandatory provisions are sometimes also referred to as “rules of immediate
application” or “peremptory rules.”; see also IVANA KUNDA, INTERNATIONALLY MANDATORY
RULES OF A THIRD COUNTRY IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT CONFLICT OF LAWS: THE ROME
CONVENTION AND THE PROPOSED ROME I REGULATION (2007); CONFLICT OF LAWS IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE CLIP PRINCIPLES AND COMMENTARY 371–376 (2013); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Mandatory Rules in Civil Litigation: Status of the Doctrine Post-Globalization,
18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 21 (2007).
217. See supra Part III for a discussion of comity.
218. GESETZ ÜBER URHEBERRECHT UND VERWANDTE SCHUTZRECHTE [Law on Copyright
and Related Rights], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL. I, as amended, § 32–32b (Ger.), translated by William Cornish in The Author as Risk-Sharer, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 14 (2003).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. E.g., Consorts Huston v. Sté Turner Entertainment, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] le civ., May 28, 1991, 149 R.I.D.A. 197 (1991) (Fr.); Loi
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Mandatory rules are justified by strong public policies that the rules reflect, and strong public policies related to IP laws may also impact the design
and application of conflict of laws rules even when the policies are not explicitly included in an IP statute.222 For example, the right to free speech
under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has a strong relation to
U.S. copyright law, but the right, although reflected in the U.S. Copyright
Act, is not explicitly formulated in the Act. Nevertheless, because copyright
law reflects free speech protections the application of choice of law rules and
the rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in copyright
cases are impacted by the public policies that underpin free speech. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit used free speech
concerns to apply the public policy exception and reject the recognition of a
French judgment that was based on French law;223 the court reasoned that
French law did not protect the defendants’ actions to the extent that the U.S.
fair use doctrine would have.224 Because the U.S. fair use doctrine is an important outgrowth of free speech in U.S. copyright law, the court could rely
on the protection of free speech as a strong public policy and apply the public policy exception.225
Finally, the application of conflict of laws rules is strongly linked to substantive IP laws whenever conflict of laws rules include a reference to the
place of the tortious activity, such as a rule of specific jurisdiction that vests
jurisdiction in the courts of the place of the tortious act or the place of the
effects of such an act,226 or a choice of law rule that calls for the application
of the law of the place of the tortious act or the place of the effects of such
an act.227 Whether an act is tortious depends on substantive law; for exam-

57-298 du 11 mars 1957 sur la propriété littéraire et artistique [Law 57-298 of March 11,
1957 on Literary and Artistic Property], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.], March 11, 1957, p. 2723, art.6 (Fr.); CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE
[C.I.P.] art. L121-1 (Fr).
222. On public policy and its role in conflict of laws in general, see Blom, supra note
215; Alex Mills, The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law, 4 J. PRIVATE INT’L
L. 201 (2008).
223. Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l. v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 482 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, the fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of
first amendment in the copyright field.” (quoting Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l,
Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1378 (2d Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
224. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also supra note 47 (describing scenario 6).
225. Viewfinder, 489 F.3d at 480–84. The approach adopted by the court in Viewfinder is
consistent with the approach that had been adopted by courts in libel cases and that Congress legislated in the 2010 SPEECH Act. Securing the Protection of our Enduring and
Established Constitutional Heritage (SPEECH) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380
(2010).
226. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2)–(3) (McKinney 2008); 735 ILL. COMP.STAT. 5/2209(a)(2) (1993); Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 22, at art. 7(2).
227. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 145 (1971) (listing
among “[c]ontacts to be taken into account,” “the place where the injury occurred,” and
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ple, whether a new product announcement can be a patent infringing offer
to sell will depend on national patent law and its interpretation.228 Where an
act occurred (the localization of an act) also depends on substantive law; for
example, as mentioned earlier in Part IV, national law determines if a shipment made “free on board” from a foreign country229 will result in a patent
infringing sale that will be deemed to have occurred in the country of destination.230
Through this link between conflict of laws rules and substantive IP laws,
substantive IP laws supply input information necessary for the application of
conflict of laws rules, and through this link the territorial reach of substantive IP laws affects the operation of conflict of laws rules. For example, under Section 271(f) of the U.S. Patent Act, supplying or causing to supply
without authority the components of a patented invention “in or from the
United States,” is an act of infringement.231 The provision signals, for the
purposes of choice of law, that even acts committed outside the United States
(for example, shipping from outside the United States) may be found infringing under U.S. patent law and therefore trigger the application of U.S.
law to the acts.232 Adjustments to the input information can therefore lead
to different results when conflict of laws rules are applied, and legislators can
make adjustments to adjust the effective territorial scope of IP laws.

“the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 378 (1934).
228. In some instances, intellectual property law will rely on another area of law to supply the meaning for a term used in an intellectual property act; thus, the territorial scope
may depend on rules from other areas of law. For example, some national patent laws rely
on national contract law to define what constitutes an “offer to sell”; other national patent
laws give the term an autonomous interpretation. See, e.g., TRIMBLE, supra note 88, at 100–
05.
229. See supra note 159 for an explanation of the term “free on board.”
230. See, e.g., MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420
F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (a sale is not necessarily precluded from occurring in the
forum “simply because an article is delivered ‘free on board’ outside of the forum”).
231. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2012).
232. Of course the determination of the tortious nature of the acts is a decision on the
merits and not a decision that a court will make when deciding on its jurisdiction or on
applicable law. See, e.g., Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light Products, Inc., 523 F.3d 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2008) “[W]hether the allegedly infringing act happened in the United States is
an element of the claim for patent infringement, not a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 1366. The question of whether the U.S. Copyright Act applies to the defendant’s acts “is properly treated as an element of the claim which must be proven before
relief can be granted, not a question of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 1368. Although
other circuit courts had taken the opposite approach and treated the extraterritorial reach
as an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, the U.S. Supreme Court has sided with the
Litecubes approach. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010) (“[T]o
ask what conduct [a provision of substantive law] reaches is to ask what conduct [the provision] prohibits, which is a merits question.”).
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VI. CALIBRATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS WITH CONFLICT
OF LAWS RULES
The previous Parts established that the effective territorial scope of IP
laws is the result of the interaction of substantive IP laws, conflict of laws
rules, and countries’ enforcement powers, and that tools exist both in substantive IP laws and conflict of laws rules that legislators can utilize to adjust
the effective territorial scope of national IP laws. But how does the effective
territorial scope of national IP laws relate to countries’ national IP policies?
Why should legislators care about the effective territorial scope of national IP
legislation (particularly any extraterritorial scope) when the legislators’ main
objective is, naturally, to ensure that the legislation implements the policies
domestically? Two examples in this Part demonstrate how a country may calibrate its IP laws with its conflict of laws rules to achieve its desired effective
territorial scope in its national IP laws and through an appropriate scope
promote its national IP policy goals.
Assume that a country, such as France, decides that it wishes to become
a new global center for software development. To effectuate this national
policy goal, France strives to assist companies that invest in software development by providing rules of copyright ownership that are helpful to the
companies. Given the collaborative nature of the software development process and the high transaction costs associated with a multiplicity of copyright
owners, France decides that its copyright law is disadvantageous to software
development companies because the law has no work for hire doctrine that
would vest copyright to all employee works in an employer; therefore, France
adopts an amendment according to which copyright in software vests automatically in the employer.233
In fact, this is exactly what France did,234 and when French legislators
adopted the legislation they very likely believed that this new provision would
apply throughout France. However, until recently nationwide applicability
was not fully the case because French courts used the law of the country of
origin as the law applicable to copyright ownership. Therefore, copyright
owners who could not claim France as the country of origin of their software
could not benefit from the new French provision on software copyright ownership. For example, the conflict of laws rule for copyright ownership increased transaction costs for the companies that developed new software in
France but were also dealing with older software developed and published by
others outside of France. The rule also meant that anyone who sued in
233. CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C.P.I.] art. L113-9 (Fr.) (“Unless otherwise provided by statutory provision or stipulation, the economic rights in the software and
its documentation created by one or more employees in the execution of their duties or
following the instructions given by their employer shall be the property of the employer
and he exclusively shall be entitled to exercise them.”).
234. The French legislation is consistent with Article 2(3) of the EU Software Directive.
Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, art. 2(3), 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16, 18 (EU).
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France for infringement of copyright to software could benefit from the
French copyright ownership rule only if France was the country of origin of
the software.
It was only recently, in April 2013, that the French Supreme Court
changed the choice of law rule for copyright ownership to the law of the protecting country, meaning that French law will now govern questions of copyright ownership even for software whose country of origin is not France.235
While this may surprise some who believe that they are copyright owners in
France (because they are, for example, copyright owners under U.S. law) but
who in fact might no longer be copyright owners in France (because French
law does not afford them copyright ownership), software development companies will benefit from the French approach if the country of origin of the
software at issue would not have afforded them copyright ownership (which
may be the case in other civil law countries without a work for hire doctrine
and without any special provisions on software copyright ownership).
One might ask why a country would opt for an approach to copyright
ownership that uses the law of a country other than the protecting country;
after all, the rule that uses the law of the protecting country to govern copyright ownership appears to maximize the effects of national policies by extending a country’s approach to copyright ownership beyond the borders of
the country whenever infringement of copyright is litigated in the country or
other reasons arise to determine ownership of copyright in the country.
However, the choice of law rule that selects the protecting country is not
suitable for all countries and all national policies. A small country with a
unique language may be a net importer of motion pictures and wish to assist
motion picture importers by respecting copyright ownership rules in the
countries of origin of the motion pictures. Concomitantly, it might not be
palatable for the small country to accept the same copyright ownership rules
that exist in the countries from which most motion pictures are imported;
perhaps the small country sees other copyright ownership rules as more favorable to its struggling native film industry. In this situation, the choice of
law rule of the law of the country of origin reflects national policy goals better than the law of the protecting country.
The operation of the internet affords a good example of the interaction
of IP laws and rules of jurisdiction. Assume that a person with no physical
presence in a country publishes material on the internet and thus commits
an act that would normally infringe copyright in that country. Copyright infringement is a strict liability offense; it does not require intent, and anything
above a de minimis infringement236 will suffice for infringement to be found,

235. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., April 10,
2013, Bull. civ. I, No. 11-12508 (Fr.); Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters] 1e civ., April 10, 2013, Bull. civ. I, No.11-12509 (Fr.).
236. A de minimis infringement is “a technical violation of a right so trivial that the law
will not impose legal consequences.” Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126
F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997).
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unless the fair use defense237 or other defenses apply. However, even if the
person appears to have infringed copyright in the country, the person can be
outside the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the country’s courts if the person is
not subject to the courts’ general jurisdiction and the country’s rules of specific jurisdiction require that the alleged infringer direct his actions at the
forum state. The jurisdictional rule is thus a limitation on the territorial
reach of the country’s substantive law of copyright infringement,238 particularly if the courts of only the country of infringement would consider the
country’s copyright law to be applicable (meaning that there is no other
country whose courts have jurisdiction and that those courts would apply the
first country’s copyright law). Of course, if the substantive law is not intended to punish an alleged infringer in situations when the infringing material
happens to travel into the territory of the protecting country inadvertently,
without the infringer’s actions,239 it may be that the country’s rules of jurisdiction are actually aligned with the territorial scope of its substantive law. If
the rules of jurisdiction do not correspond to the country’s IP policies, however, the rules may need to be adjusted to serve the policies.
The primary locus of national IP policies will always be in national substantive IP laws, which will reflect and implement the policies and do so not
only through the substance but also through the territorial scope that they
will convey. When focusing on the territorial design of IP laws, however, legislators must consider the role of conflict of laws rules and the degree to
which the rules comport to the reaching of the goals of national IP policies.
The focus on the territorial scope of U.S. federal IP legislation may have to
concern Congress more now than it did previously because of the U.S. Supreme Court’s strengthening of the presumption against extraterritoriality240
and the potential need to re-evaluate when an extraterritorial application of
U.S. law is desirable. The interest in the territorial scope of IP legislation
should generate a debate about national IP policies in a transnational context and the potential need for federal legislation on conflict of laws.

VII. CONCLUSION
The increasing frequency and intensity of cross-border activities concerning IP has highlighted the importance of delineating the reach of na237. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012) “[T]he amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole” is one of the factors that U.S. courts consider
in the fair use analysis. Id.
238. Case C-170/12, Pinckney v. KDG Mediatech AG, 2013 E.C.R. (addressing the requirement of purposeful direction in the context of jurisdiction in a copyright infringement case). On purposeful targeting as a requirement under EU substantive law see Case
C-5/11, In re Donner, 2012 E.C.L.I 370.
239. See, e.g., Pinckney, supra note 238, at para. 64 (suggesting that the CJEU adopt the
same approach to the localization of the place of the effects of the tortious activity as it did
to the localization of the harm for the purposes of substantive law).
240. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
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tional IP laws; the rising numbers of cross-border disputes concerning IP
rights are now testing the effects of this reach. Clarifying the effective territorial scope of national IP laws is not merely a matter of mechanically legislating substantive laws; the process of delineating the effective reach of the
laws must include considerations of national IP policies and reflect those policies in the laws’ effective territorial scope. Nor can the implementation of
national policies continue to be based solely on the regulation of purely domestic activities, with cross-border activities being treated as insignificant outliers. The increasing frequency and intensity of cross-border activities require that legislators consider the territorial scope of national laws when they
decide on how to implement national policies.
For the effective territorial scope of national laws to be consistent with
national policies, the territorial scope of national substantive laws must be
calibrated with conflict of laws rules. Legislators need to concentrate on
more than just defining the territorial scope of substantive laws; while the
territorial limits of prescriptive jurisdiction are important, the limits of prescriptive jurisdiction alone do not define the effective territorial scope of national laws. The effective territorial scope of national laws depends on the
interaction of the territorial scope of substantive laws, conflict of laws rules,
and countries’ enforcement powers. Because the territorial scope of the enforcement power is usually not readily adjustable, legislators must focus on
the interaction of substantive laws and conflict of laws rules and aim to make
whatever adjustments are necessary to both areas of law so that desired national policies will be implemented. In countries that have recognized this
interaction legislators have developed special conflict of laws rules targeted
at implementing specific national policies in IP disputes.
For the United States, the challenge is that while Congress legislates
federal IP matters, Congress has been rather passive in the conflict of laws
area. Unless Congress engages in designing conflict of laws rules, its ability
to shape the territorial scope of federal IP laws in a manner that is beneficial
to the implementation of national IP policies will be limited. Of course
courts may succeed in adjusting the design and application of conflict of laws
rules to respect national IP policies; however, it is unrealistic to expect courts
to take into consideration the full scope of the policies, particularly when the
courts lack information about the future trajectory of the policies.
The fact that the effective territorial scope of national laws can be adjusted only through the calibration of the territorial scope of national substantive laws and conflict of laws rules also has important consequences at
the international level. Even if national legislators calibrate IP laws and conflict of laws rules according to the goals of national IP policies, the success of
the calibration may be curtailed by other countries’ conflict of laws rules.
These rules continue to be “moving pieces” until countries agree to set uniform standards for conflict of laws rules; only if countries agree on uniform
conflict of laws rules can legislators operate with clarity about other countries’ rules. Even an agreement on conflict of laws rules, however, will not
suffice to secure international uniformity in the effective territorial scope of
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national IP laws; for such uniformity countries would need to calibrate their
conflict of laws rules and the territorial scope of national IP laws at the international level to the same degree that they need to calibrate them at the national level. There can be no international uniformity in the effective territorial scope of national IP laws without a coordinated international approach
involving both the territorial scope of national IP laws and conflict of laws
rules. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that international uniformity can be
achieved in the foreseeable future; given recent developments in international IP negotiations, it is unlikely that the IP area will soon see any new extensive treaty activity, and the Hague Conference’s Judgments Project may
prove as challenging now as it did in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Despite the continuing challenges, the Judgments Project and recent
academic projects focusing on the intersection of IP law and conflict of laws
rules have been and continue to be successful at bringing experts in the two
fields together and producing a wealth of materials for future discussion. At
national levels the interaction of the two areas often seems to be overlooked
or underestimated. Conflict of laws rules are sometimes perceived as rigid
and subject to their own sets of rules and policies, and therefore unsuitable
for reflecting national policies specific to a substantive area of law, such as IP
law. As this Article points out, this perception of conflict of laws is incorrect,
and national legislators should examine the rules when they seek tools to
implement various national policies, including IP policies.

